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A brief abstract: 
 
This Master’s Thesis aims at presenting a comprehensive picture of Kierkegaard’s 
concept of faith. It particularly stresses the fact that Kierkegaard argues for faith on an 
existential basis, and therefore tries to show how faith must not simply be understood 
as an absolute belief in God, but as a state that has a specific existential function. It 
argues, furthermore, that this function is to place man in a state of emotional 
autonomy, which it understands as a state wherein the individual is immune to being 
adversely affected emotionally by exterior circumstances – it is immune to angst and 
despair. 
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The roses of the gardens of Adonis 
 
 
The roses of the gardens of Adonis 
Are what I love, Lydia, those flitting roses 
     That in the day when they are born, 
      Within that day, die. 
 
The light’s for them eternal, because they 
Are born with the sun born already, and sink 
     Before Apollo may yet leave 
      The visible course he has. 
 
Like them, let us make of our lives one day, - 
Voluntarily, Lydia, unknowing 
     That there is night before and after 
      The little that we last. 
 
 
- Ricardo Reis (Fernando Pessoa, Selected Poems, 95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
”Medens nu den rene Tænken uden videre hæver al 
Bevægelse, eller meningsløst faaer den ind med i 
Logiken, er Vanskeligheden for den Existerende, at give 
Existentsen den Continueerlighed, uden hvilken Alt blot 
forsvinder.” 
 
- Søren Kierkegaard (Afsluttende uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift I, 301) 
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1 - General introduction 
 
 
1.1 - Main thesis 
 
This Master's Thesis grew out of an attempt to understand Søren Kierkegaard's 
Sygdommen til Døden. More specifically, it grew out of an attempt to understand what 
it means in that book not to be in despair. This state appeared namely to me when I 
first read it as the natural summit, or culmination, of the thoughts expressed in it. It 
was the blind spot about which the work as a whole revolved, so to speak. For though 
it manifestly and explicitly was (and is) an analysis of despair, this analysis is given, 
as Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus) says in the preface, in order to be edifying.
1
 It is 
given, therefore, in order for it to be left behind, in order for the reader to climb up 
upon it, and reach the antithesis of the despair that it itself describes. What I am 
saying, is that upon reading Sygdommen til Døden I became convinced that the 
intention behind the text, was not principally to present a theoretical understanding of 
despair (which though represents the main bulk, if not the whole bulk, of the text), but 
to move the reader out of that state of despair that it described, and into this state’s 
natural negation (its natural and complementary opposite). Its purpose was hence not 
principally to enlighten - to enable the reader to view the phenomenon of despair from 
a view-point of disinterest, and gain a theoretical understanding of it, but to induce the 
reader into a form of Freudian catharsis: To make him gain a novel understanding of 
himself and his subjective nature, and therefrom to catapult him into "a higher level of 
existence". 
 
Naturally, it was this next level that fascinated me. What was it? I understood it 
vaguely of course, by means of the contrast that the book set before me. It was the 
state of not being in despair - and despair, roughly speaking, the state of not being 
what one would like to be. Ergo, the ideal state was the state of being satisfied with 
oneself (or, more correctly, not dissatisfied), in some manner or other. But seeing 
Kierkegaard's careful and erudite analysis of the various states of despair, of its 
workings and causes, I found myself wanting a similar analysis of its complementary 
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 Søren Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 2nd. 
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state. But about this, little, or nearly nothing, was straightforwardly revealed. 
 
This experience was of course disappointing and unsatisfactory. But the frustration it 
produced grew into a fixation and this fixation led me to immerse myself into a large 
part of Kierkegaard's textual corpus in search of a positive definition, or description, 
of this ideal state. Through this wider reading I came to understand that what I sought 
actually was a kind of half-invisible nexus in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. For what always 
seems to preoccupy Kierkegaard on a general level throughout his numerous writings, 
whether directly, or indirectly, is a process of gradual psychological transformation, 
wherein an individual psyche goes from an unwholesome original state and to an ideal 
and healthy one (goes from a state of despair or angst, to one of bliss). Many of his 
works can explicitly be seen to map out the various phases, or stages, that a psyche 
can find itself to be in, in-between this first state and the last. But as with Sygdommen 
til Døden, Kierkegaard does not produce these analyses for their own benefit, or for 
the benefit of disinterested contemplation, and it is, in a manner of speaking, wrong to 
approach them as if they were written purely as such theoretical pieces. They are 
instead and always, as are the works of Kierkegaard near contemporary Karl Marx, an 
admixture of theoretical insight and polemical intention. Kierkegaard did not write 
solely to furnish us with truths and points of view. He sought to save us, to propel us 
forward by means of his words into that ideal state that he himself so softly spoke 
about. Which is the same as what Marx did. But, as regards the nature of the ideal 
these two authors are engaged with, they are very different indeed. Marx sought the 
liberation of the proletariat through a negation of capitalist society, while 
Kierkegaard, he sought to liberate the individual from his worldly concerns, and to 
deliver him into a personal relation to God. But more than that - and here comes the 
crux of the matter - for in as much as I became aware of the practical intent behind 
Kierkegaard's writings, I was lead, naturally enough, to focus upon the practical 
consequence of the attainment of his ideal: Which is that one develops, what I term, 
emotional autonomy. And by this I mean a state in which one is immune to being 
adversely affected emotionally by exterior circumstances, such as the behaviour of 
other people. Alternatively, one could also define it by use of Kierkegaard’s concept 
of despair, as so: Emotional autonomy is a state of not being in despair. Which means, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
edition (Valby: DSL/Borgen, 2003), 165. 
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according to Kierkegaard's understanding of despair, that it is that state of not being 
able to experience despair - at all. It transcends (or negates) the very possibility of 
despair: "...[T]hi kun Den er frelst fra Fortvivlelse, som er evig frelst fra 
Fortvivlelse."
2
 
 
This, then, is the main thesis I propose to defend: Kierkegaard's ideal state is a state of 
emotional autonomy. 
 
Now, I can easily imagine to myself that this characterization of Kierkegaard's ideal 
state, as a state of emotional autonomy, may strike the reader already acquainted with 
Kierkegaard as oddly missing the point. The reason for this, I believe, will be that 
emotional autonomy manifestly is not what forms the explicit centre of Kierkegaard's 
sparse discussions of this state. Now, for one, I am not claiming that it is. I fully 
recognize that Kierkegaard's own explicit notion of his ideal state is as a religious 
state. A religious state defined as a consciously, subjective and irrational (or absurd) 
belief in God. My point is simply that this is not all there is to this state. For had that 
been the case, the religious state could not have been defined as it is - as the state of 
not being despair. (For it should be quite obvious that an absolute belief alone - which 
simply is a state of absolute conviction, could not relieve one permanently of despair.) 
Nor could Kierkegaard have argued for the religious sphere as he does – for example 
in Begrebet Angest, Frygt og Bæven, and Sygdommen til Døden, where his argument 
is, quintessentially, that you ought to believe, as faith relieves you of the possibility of 
emotional distress - angst, despair.
3
 What I am saying, then, is that emotional 
autonomy has to be a component of Kierkegaard's concept of faith, if faith is to do 
what Kierkegaard claims that it does. It is as simple as that. 
 
What I propose to do, in order to give due credence to both of the elements of 
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 Søren Kierkegaard, Kjerlighedens Gjerninger: 'ogle christelige Overveielser i Talers Form, 2nd 
edition (Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 2003), 47. 
3
 For an easy verification of this point, I refer you to the two following key quotes: ”Idet da Individet 
ved Angesten dannes til Troen, da vil Angesten netop udrydde, hvad den selv frembringer.” Søren 
Kierkegaard, Begrebet Angest (DSL/Borgen, 1998), 145. And: ”Derimod er denne Modsætning gjort 
gjældende i hele dette Skrift, der strax i første Afsnit A, A opstillede Formelen for den Tilstand, hvori 
der slet ingen Fortvivlelse er: i at forholde sig til sig selv og i at ville være sig selv grunder Selvet 
gjennemsigtigt i den Magt, som satte det. Hvilken Formel igjen, hvorom oftere er mindet, er 
Definitionen paa Tro.” Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; 
Taler, 279. As regards Frygt og Bæven, the point will be treated thoroughly in Chapter 3. 
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Kierkegaard’s concept of faith that I have mentioned, is to understand faith, in 
Kierkegaard’s sense, as involving two levels that stand interrelated to each other. The 
first level being constituted by an absolute belief in God (which may be said to be the 
more obvious and most central feature of Kierkegaard's concept), the second level of 
a utilization of this absolute belief to transcend the possibility of despair. And the 
whole of these two levels is what I will ultimately speak of as "faith" in Kierkegaard's 
sense, as you cannot really have the one without the other. The first level is what 
makes possible the second, and the second is what motivates one to attain the first 
(this will be explained more thoroughly in Section 2.4). 
  
My overall intention in this essay is, therefore, to attempt to show the importance that 
emotional autonomy plays in Kierkegaard's concept of faith, and to explain how this 
state of emotional autonomy relates to the absolute belief in God. I will attempt to do 
this through creating a sort of walkthrough that portrays each step that it is necessary 
to traverse in order to reach faith proper - which is the state of having an absolute 
belief in God and utilizing this to avoid despair. I will go about this through two main 
discussions, one that has as its goal to explain the first level in the concept of faith 
(Chapter 2), and one that explains the second level (Chapter 3).  
 
* 
 
Before I begin, I would like, though, to make some technical remarks about the 
contents of this enquiry: 
 
When discussing Christianity, I am always referring to Kierkegaard's interpretation of 
it. I never attempt to approach it in a sense that diverges from this. 
 
As regards the topic of Kierkegaard as a pseudonymous author, I am not going to 
place too much importance on this fact. Consequently, I will not name which 
pseudonym is saying what in every quote I present. Mostly, I will simply name 
Kierkegaard. The reason for this has to do with the nature of my enquiry. I am here 
after “the big picture” of Kierkegaard’s philosophical project, which means that my 
first interest is not towards the differences between the various pseudonyms, but in 
what manner they are expressions of the same whole. My conviction is that the 
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pseudonyms represent, in the form of fictional characters, the various psychological 
stages that Kierkegaard imagines there to exist in-between man’s natural and 
unwholesome original condition, and the ideal religious state. Therefore, I am not 
denying that there exists contexts in which it is important to remember whom is 
saying what (and if this becomes important in my discussion, I will of course bring 
attention to the fact), but mostly, as my discussion relates to the last stage of the 
psychological process, the summit of Kierkegaard’s philosophical vision – which is 
the same for all the pseudonyms, as they represent stages of the same process, steps 
leading up to the same view – I feel it unnecessary to draw attention to which 
pseudonym is saying what. It is more important to me, and to my case, to bring 
attention to the fact that though Kierkegaard is a pseudonymous author – it is 
nonetheless Kierkegaard himself that has created every pseudonym. (In either case, 
familiarity with the original texts will easily enough disclose to the interested reader 
which pseudonym is responsible for which quote.) 
 
As a last point I would like to bring to your attention that in quoting every emphasis 
that appears is Kierkegaard's, unless otherwise noted.
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2 - The first level of faith; an absolute belief in God 
 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we are going to investigate faith in as much as it is an absolute belief 
in God. And by that I mean we are going to try to understand how one acquires such a 
belief - as this is manifestly not easily done. The treatment will not take into 
consideration everything that Kierkegaard has written about this, but will rely instead 
on three of the central pieces: Frygt og Bæven, Sygdommen til Døden, and first and 
foremostly Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. It will, furthermore, be an attempt 
to present the rough main idea of the matter. It will not go into every conceivable 
detail. 
 
In the three works mentioned, Kierkegaard gives and formulates three seemingly 
different definitions of faith. And let us begin by taking a brief look at these, as a 
general point of departure for our general discussion: In Frygt og Bæven, Kierkegaard 
defines faith as an individual's individual and absolute relation to an Absolute. In 
Sygdommen til Døden, it is seen as the state of not being in despair. And in 
Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, it is seen as the state of consciously having 
chosen to believe in something objectively paradoxical.
4
 
 
These three definitions, though they may appear to be unrelated, are not contrasting or 
contesting definitions. They are merely three characterizations of faith that each 
emphasizes a different feature, or trait, of faith's nature. And, furthermore, no matter 
which of the three we had chosen to investigate more properly, it would have been the 
case that the central feature of faith would have been the same. That it is a belief in 
God that is absolute – and irrational (inherently subjective). 
 
This state of affairs is not coincidental. As there is in Kierkegaard's concept of faith a 
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definitions are further explained. 
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necessary connection between irrationality and absoluteness. Not generally speaking, 
of course. But in relation to God as an Absolute for man, and man's absolute belief in 
God. This is something I will return to quite often and from several different angles 
throughout this essay, as it is maybe the most central feature of Kierkegaard's 
doctrine. 
 
But, before we go begin to go into that, faith, in its simplest sense, is, of course, 
nothing but a belief in the truth of God and Christianity. So, why, should one ask 
oneself, does Kierkegaard give such an apparently unintuitive definitions of it? 
 
Though I raise this question, I will not give the answer to it directly, as to understand 
the answer presupposes that one is acquainted with Kierkegaard's views on human 
nature, with his views on psychology and epistemology, and with his thoughts about 
what role Christianity ought to play in the lives of men. My intention is instead to 
treat this question indirectly as I proceed with my enquiry into the nature of faith in 
this part of the essay, and it will, hopefully, become clearer as to why he gives the 
mentioned definitions that he does at the end of it. 
 
On the other hand though, it is important to understand right from the beginning that 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith, however one formulates it, is developed as a response 
to the age-old question of whether God exists, or not - of whether Christianity is true, 
or not? For it is this question: "How do I become a Christian?" that Kierkegaard 
himself takes as the defining question in regard to his thought.
5
 Now, the answer he 
gives, which is what we are interested in here, is an ingenious doctrine that 
emphasizes the importance of the fact that the question of God's existence cannot, 
rationally, be answered, and that through utilizing a Hegelian mechanism – the 
principle of negation – shows how this negative fact can be made into a springboard 
by which one is able to actually acquire an absolute belief in the existence of God – 
given that one is aware of the nature of one's own epistemic and existential situation. 
 
In essence: One acquires faith, according to Kierkegaard, not through a positive 
recognition of a fact, but by negating a state of absolute doubt. 
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Is this paradoxical? That conviction can grow out of a manifest state of disbelief? 
Yes, in a sense, I believe it is. But I do not believe that it is harmful kind of 
paradoxicality. And I suggest that we abstain from judging it too harshly until we 
have explored the whole of the doctrine a little more closely. What I have stated in the 
paragraphs above, I have formulated so as to be strictly to the point, and, followingly, 
it presupposes a great deal of knowledge of Kierkegaard to be understood correctly, 
and judged fairly. 
 
 
2.2 - Concerning the three definitions of faith, and the general nature of despair 
 
Let us therefore begin our investigation: What is faith? 
 
According to the third and last definition presented in Section 2.1, it is the state of 
having consciously chosen to believe in something objectively paradoxical. In 
Kierkegaard's original wording, or one of the wordings that is, it is formulated as 
follows: "Naar Socrates troede, at Gud er til, da fastholdt han den objektive Uvished 
med Inderlighedens hele Lidenskab, og i denne Modsigelse, i denne Risico er netop 
Troen. 'u er det anderledes, istedetfor den objektive Uvished, er her Visheden om at 
det objektivt seet er det Absurde, og dette Absurde fastholdt i Inderlighedens 
Lidenskab er Troen."
6
 
 
What is meant in this quote by the phrase "dette Absurde fastholdt i Inderlighedens 
Lidenskab er Troen" is best seen if we place the phrase in relation to one of 
Kierkegaard's other definitions of faith that is also given in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift: "Uden Risico ingen Tro. Tro er netop Modsigelsen mellem Inderlighedens 
uendelige Lidenskab og den objektive Uvished. Kan jeg objektivt gribe Gud, saa troer 
jeg ikke, men netop fordi jeg ikke kan det, derfor maa jeg troe; og vil bevare mig i 
Troen, maa jeg bestandig passe paa, at jeg fastholder den objektive Uvished, at jeg i 
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6
 Søren Kierkegaard, Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift I, udgivet med indledning og kommentar af 
Niels Thulstrup, (Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1962), 196. 
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den objektive Uvished er "paa de 70.000 Favne Vand", og dog troer."
7
 
 
The idea that Kierkegaard is presenting is, therefore, as I have already indicated, that 
faith is a form of belief that is characterized by its own absurdity. One believes in 
God, in the sense that one has faith in him, precisely because one cannot know God. 
Because one cannot comprehend and rationally recognize him - this meaning that his 
presence, or absence, cannot be verified by our limited empirical means. Therefore, 
one has to have faith in him instead.
8
 And this "has" points to an elementary feature 
of Kierkegaard's psychology and anthropology, namely that he identifies a basic need 
for an Absolute in man. (This will be treated later on in Section 2.5.)   
 
Based on these considerations – which we take at face value, at this point – we can 
see that the human condition can be described, according to Kierkegaard, as 
characterized by an essential impotence - it needs something that it, in a plain sense, 
cannot have. It needs an Absolute, God, but it cannot have it using its own natural 
epistemic resources. 
 
Faith is the answer to this dilemma. For it places, to use the first definition given in 
Section 2.1 (the one gathered from Frygt og Bæven), the individual in an absolute 
relation to the Absolute. But it does this by going beyond the natural capabilities of 
man. By venturing in upon a risk. In essence, what happens here is that the subject 
understands the limitations inherent in his own epistemic capacities, and guided by 
this knowledge, he chances to leap beyond them. He chooses to believe in God. 
 
This wholly subjective and free choice is what lands him in a relation to an Absolute. 
And when I say that it "lands him" this does not mean that he actually comes into 
contact with an Absolute - objectively speaking. No, what happens is that the state of 
belief that he creates through his act of choosing gains a form of absoluteness by 
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 Kierkegaard, Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift I, 190. 
8
 There is a natural difference of meaning between "belief" and "faith" that I play upon here (and that 
Kierkgaard plays upon all the time). This can be seen through the phrase "you ought to have faith", 
which says that though you cannot know, you ought not fear the worst, you ought instead to believe 
that it is going to turn out for the best. Hence, you ought to believe in something more than you are 
rationally entitled to. The word "faith", therefore - in one of its meanings - naturally points towards the 
state of believing in something you rationally ought not believe in (in the sense that you have no 
rational reasons for it). 
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virtue of being an autonomous act on behalf of the subject. In virtue of the choice, the 
belief becomes absolute for him, and the content of the belief becomes followingly an 
Absolute - for him. The point is that the absoluteness does not stem from a source 
exterior to the subject itself. 
 
Let me expound a little: A normal belief is what we can, using Kantian terminology in 
a broadened sense, call heteronomous. For a normal belief is informed by, and hence, 
dependent upon, an objective reason to be what it is. It is a response to a fact. And this 
causes it to be a conditional state of conviction. For had the fact in question not been 
the case, the belief would not be the belief that it is. Furthermore, if the fact were to 
change, if new information were to surface that throws a new light upon it and its 
importance, then the belief would also have to change. 
 
In this manner, a normal state of conviction and belief is dependent upon the grounds 
upon which it is made, and it is bound to fluctuate with the fluctuation of these 
grounds. Furthermore, the only manner in which to reach an absolute belief in this 
sense, is if one would find an absolute fact. One that is guaranteed never to fluctuate. 
But in relation to God, this is impossible according to Kierkegaard. 
 
In contradistinction to the normal belief that is created through a positive recognition 
of a fact, faith is not in possession of such dependence. It is a belief created by the 
subject itself, and hence immune to rational corrections because it is created as 
something consciously irrational. Something to which rationality does not apply, and 
it is in this sense that it is absolute. Not because it cannot possibly be wrong, but 
because rational considerations do not count. 
 
This situation does not make it absolutely independent upon anything whatever, for 
by being the sole work of the subject itself, it followingly becomes dependent 
precisely upon the subject. And the stability of the belief becomes a function of the 
stability of the subject's commitment to it. Therefore, as Kierkegaard states, what is 
presupposed in order to acquire true faith is "den uendelige personlige i Lidenskab 
Interesserethed"
9
. For in order for the belief to become absolute, the commitment to 
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the belief has to be absolute, and therefore fuelled by an absolute need. It must arise 
out of something that is truly of infinite importance to the individual, so that it is not 
something in which the individual will waver. 
 
This brings us in relation to the third and last definition mentioned in Section 2.1 - 
that faith is the state of not being in despair. For the need that I spoke about at the end 
of the last paragraph, is precisely the need to relieve oneself of one's despair. And this 
need is an infinite need in so far as the subject in question is concerned, because the 
need springs out of the very core of the subject's being. That is not to say that a 
subject is, so to speak, hard-wired to be in despair, and that despair is a plain effect of 
his constitution. Kierkegaard takes great pains to emphasize this fact, as he says: 
"Fortvivlelse er Misforholdet i en Syntheses Forhold, som forholder sig til sig selv. 
Men Synthesen er ikke Misforholdet, den er blot Muligheden, eller, i Synthesen ligger 
Muligheden af Misforholdet. Var Synthesen Misforholdet, saa var Fortvivlelse slet 
ikke til, saa vilde Fortvivlelse være 'oget, der laae i Menneskenaturen som saadan, 
det er, saa var det ikke Fortvivlelse; den vilde være 'oget, der hændte Mennesket, 
'oget han leed, som en Sygdom, i hvilken Mennesket falder, eller som Døden, der er 
Alles Lod. Nei, det at fortvivle ligger i Mennesket selv; men var han ikke Synthese, 
kunde han slet ikke fortvivle, og var Synthesen ikke oprindeligt fra Guds Haand i det 
rette Forhold, kunde han heller ikke fortvivle."
10
 
 
Let me explain a little: In this quote, it is presupposed that man is seen as a synthesis 
of the infinite and finite, alternatively, the contingent and the necessary, or the eternal 
and the temporal. These three are equivalent in rough respects. And that he is such a 
synthesis, or relation, that inherently relates to itself. Man is therefore, in essence, a 
relation in-between two opposites that relates to itself. And this self-relation on part of 
the relation is what Kierkegaard defines as man's self - man's personal and private 
relation to who and what he himself is.
11
 This basic self-relation is furthermore not a 
relation in the sense of interior awareness, or interior perception, of oneself. But in the 
sense of possessing an opinion, or judgement of oneself. What it testifies to, is that 
man, basically, is a being that has a conscience. A being that is multilayered in the 
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 Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 175. My 
emphasis. 
11
 Se especially Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 
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sense that it is an opinionated presence to itself as it also is an opinionated presence to 
the world at large. 
 
Now it is here, in the relation of this self-reflexivity, that we find despair. And 
necessarily so, though not "necessarily" in the sense of a natural law, but in the sense 
of a sociological, or psychological law. A relation of cause and effect that belongs to 
the workings of the psyche as such, and does not in any way incriminate on the 
psyche's autonomy over itself, as it describes its very nature, and the way in which it 
functions. Despair is thus bound to develop, not because of any mechanical regularity 
in man's constitution (like death is an example of) but because of how the psyche 
itself is structured: Because man is inherently in the dual position of simultaneously 
being both the judge of himself and the accused that is judged. He is a standard unto 
himself. And thereby, when he is called upon to function in this regard, which he 
inevitably will be, given the nature of human existence, then he will be in the position 
that he deviates from what he thinks he ought to be. And this is despair. It is the 
situation of not wanting to be who one is, or, alternatively, of wanting to be someone 
other than one is. To not be at peace with oneself. 
 
The point of this short and partial exposition on the nature of despair,
12
 is so that we 
have it clear before us how Kierkegaard conceives of despair as being something 
infinite, or we can say, using more modern terms, constant, in regard to an individual. 
Despair represents a natural and inevitable psychological state. (Beware that I use 
"natural" here in the sense explained above.) 
 
Faith is the contrast of this state. It is the subjective choice of believing fully in God, 
made with the interest in mind to escape the state of despair that is man's natural state. 
As to precisely how a belief in God might relieve man of despair that will be the 
subject of Chapter 3. Here, we will satisfy ourselves by stating that this is the case.  
 
Let me now introduce, as a bridge to the next section, a new aspect of faith. For 
though faith is the negation of despair - the state of not being in despair - this is not to 
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imply that the state of faith is wholly without its own share of emotional agony. By 
attaining it, one namely locks oneself into a continually repeated struggle of doubt and 
conviction. But it is a struggle that frees one from despair, and is of a different nature 
than it, by being wholly under the control of the subject itself. Despair, in contrast, is 
not something one has control over in the same sense. It is, as Kierkegaard describes 
it, a sickness in the self - "Sygdommen til Døden". It is, therefore, something alien to 
the subject. Or rather, to formulate it more thoroughly, by being the alienation of the 
self by itself (the state of not being what one wants to be), despair constitutes a divide 
in the self, and it is this divide, this fragmentation of the self into one part against the 
other, that is the alien factor. The self is not whole. It is cracked, and this crack is an 
intrusion into the self of something that does not, ideally, belong there. 
 
With a view to this, we can see that despair also meaningfully can be described as a 
kind of struggle, but, if so, it would not be of the same kind as the religious one. It 
would be of a kind that take place in the self, with the self as a form of helpless 
witness to its own agonies. As I have said, it is a struggle of the self against itself, in 
which one level of the self is attacking and condemning another level for not being 
what the first level wants it to be. By contrast, the religious struggle is not something 
that takes place in the self in the same manner. That is not to say that it is not in the 
self in a broadened sense, for it is manifestly an event that takes place in the interior 
of a person, but the religious struggle is not one of the self against itself. And it is in 
virtue of this that it does not take place in the self in the manner that despair does. The 
religious struggle is rather a struggle that helps constitute the self as an unbroken 
whole. Through this struggle, which is a continuous struggle, the self is made into 
something definite and free of internal contradictions. 
 
Now, in order to move ahead, and to better understand the foregoing, we have to take 
a closer look on the nature of the religious struggle, and simultaneously, in how it 
relates to faith as an absolute. More importantly, we have to answer an obvious 
question that at this point presents itself, namely: How does the struggle of doubt and 
conviction that I mention as a necessary factor in the religious state, relate to the other 
fact that I have mentioned, that faith is a state immune to rational corrections? 
 
The problem that underlies this last question is that if faith is immune to rational 
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corrections, as I have said it is, how can (rational) doubt be an essential factor in its 
production? 
 
 
2.3 - The first step towards faith 
 
The answer to this question lies, as a matter of course, in the genesis of faith - in how 
the subject comes to gain it. In reviewing this process we will come to see two things 
that are of especial importance: Firstly that the religious state is not something that is 
gained in one stroke, and then put aside in order to function latently. It is rather 
something that must be continually upheld and kept mentally in focus. So that if we 
were to liken faith with a flame, it would not be the case that it burned on perpetually 
after we had kindled it, it would instead, like any other flame, demand continual 
maintenance. Meaning in this context: a constant passion and commitment on behalf 
of the subject. Faith is not something a subject can passively rest in. As it depends 
upon the subject's own commitment to it in order to be kept in place. Faith is 
nourished forth from within the subject, and in order to keep it in place, it must be 
continually nourished.  
 
This need for a continual repetition of the commitment to God, which my metaphor of 
nourishment represents, can be said to be the form of the religious struggle. It’s 
content being the opposition between doubt and conviction. And this form of the 
struggle is a factor that is directly connected to the nature of existence as something 
that is in continual becoming. Which is the prime feature of existence as such to 
Kierkegaard. What is meant by it is nothing more than the obvious fact that man is 
forced to live, when he lives as we do, amidst changing and unstable circumstances. 
And that, as a consequence of this, his interior mental life is forced to mirror the 
instability of his surroundings. This in the sense that it t is forced to continually 
respond to something new and something different as the world around it continually 
becomes new and different. Thus man himself as he appears to himself is locked in a 
continual process of change and development. For throughout his life, his priorities 
and his beliefs will tend to change. They will evolve as new factors and new "truths" 
enter into one's mind in the course of one's accumulation of experience. What was 
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important to one, and true for one, in one's childhood, was not the same as in one's 
adolescence, and it will not be the same as when one has grown old. One will change. 
And if faith is to be absolute, infinite and unconditional, it has to stand against this 
tendency. 
 
Now, the second thing about faith of especial importance, regards the content of the 
struggle. This being the opposition mentioned between doubt and the state of faith 
itself - absolute conviction. For this is not a struggle of the one against the other. The 
struggle is actually constituted by the difficulty of moving from the one and to other. 
So when I speak of "a struggle", I am not intending it in the sense of a competition 
between two comparable forces over which is the strongest (or most rational). The 
struggle is to overcome the limits of the first state, and reach the next, and this in a 
purely one-way motion. But it is a one-way motion that must be repeated and 
repeated, because the religious state, as I said above, is one that must continually be 
confirmed. 
 
The religious struggle seen in its entirety is therefore two-faced: On the one hand, it is 
constituted as a continuous and unending process, a battle that must be fought at each 
and every moment, which in itself, of course, is quite a struggle. And on the other 
hand, the struggle itself, the actual struggle in regard to the religious, is that one has 
to at each and every moment overcome the mentioned state of doubt by negating it. 
 
Now, in order to be able to accomplish this negation, or as has become Kierkegaard's 
most famous term for it: "the leap of faith", one has first to place oneself in what I 
will call: the correct jumping position. For one cannot go through with it wholly 
spontaneously and after one's own immediate accord from whatever position one is in, 
so to speak. One cannot just open one's front door and bellow out towards the world: 
"I believe!" For one thing, if you truly have come to believe, that is, if you truly have 
acquired an absolute belief in God, it would not matter for you what the world 
believes that you believe. And the act of proclaiming it would not only be fruitless, 
but that one has the need to proclaim it thus shows that the belief in question is not at 
all that absolute. As Kierkegaard states in a very telling passage from Synspunktet for 
min Forfatter-Virksomed: "Og saaledes ogsaa med den Religieuse, der, om galt skulde 
være, ikke kunde utholde at ansees for den Eneste, som ikke var religieus. Thi at 
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kunne udholde dette er just i Reflexionen den nøiagtigste Bestemmelse af væsentlig 
Religiusitet."
13
 As the truly religious person has to his interior mind transcended his 
mundane and earthly existence, and that includes the social world he is situated in. 
 
Likewise, one cannot just as spontaneously whisper to oneself under one's breath that 
"I believe!". And the reason for this is that the belief has to spring out of the right kind 
of circumstance and soil for it to become truly fixed. Remember: Faith is an absolute 
belief. Its trademark is therefore that it is unable to waver and change. And it gets this 
trademark by not being a response to a reason, so that, as is likely the case with such 
spontaneous beliefs as described above, that it originates in some social factor, or 
other - in a need to be accepted by others, or oneself, as a representative of a certain 
social type, and this is simply not good enough for a motivating reason. For at one 
time or another, for example after one has encountered a highly charismatic Atheist, 
this impetus to believe may loose its momentum and falter, and followingly one 
doesn't believe. But then, by Kierkegaard's reasoning, one never believed. Faith is 
absolute, or it is not faith. 
  
The relevant circumstance capable of engendering faith is a state of absolute doubt. 
And by that I mean  a doubt that defies any kind of resolution, and that it is 
impossible to rationally appease. Followingly, this constitutes what I termed the 
jumping position, and it is also this that represents the main difficulty in attaining 
faith - that one has to make a step beyond reason in order to get at it. 
 
But this does of course not represent the only problem. The above mentioned 
difficulty, represents rather what I term as "the second step towards faith" - the step 
that actually brings you into it. There is a prior difficulty to this, what I call "the first 
step towards faith", and it is that of actually reaching a state of absolute doubt. For 
such a state demands that one is in possession of an absolute paradox, something that 
is manifestly and incontrovertibly false. But not only that. It must at the same time 
that it shows itself as manifestly false, also proclaim itself to be the Absolute. For that 
is, after all, what we are after in this context.  
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It must, therefore, be a self-contradictory Absolute. 
 
According to Kierkegaard, we find such a self-contradictory Absolute as this, that 
qualifies to both criteria, in the main idea of the Christian Gospel. To quote 
Kierkegaard: "Den Sætning, at Gud har været til i menneskelig Skikkelse, er bleven 
født, har voxet, o.s.v., er vel Paradoxet sensu strictissimo, det absolute Paradox."
14
 Or 
as he says at another place: "Christendommen har nu selv forkyndt sig at være den 
evige væsentlige Sandhed, der er blevet til i Tiden, den har forkyndt sig som 
Paradoxet, og fordret Troens Inderlighed i Forhold til hvad der er Jøder en Forargelse 
og Græker en Daarskab - og Forstanden det Absurde."
15
 
 
The paradoxicality of the Christian Gospel, as Kierkegaard describes it in the two 
above quotes, lies then in the fact that they claim that God - the eternal truth, the 
Absolute itself - has come into being at a specific point in time. That The Infinite 
Being has been born and raised and has died and been resurrected - that it has had a 
life span akin to a mere mortal, but still is God, still is eternal. Which, we must 
confess, is a manifest paradox. Seeing as something eternal, or infinite, can never be 
claimed to have a beginning, for then, by force of logic, there would exist a period in 
which the object in question did not exist - the period before its beginning, and hence 
it would not be eternal. 
 
It is important to understand that Kierkegaard does not view this paradox as the 
product of some misunderstanding on behalf of men in regard to God, or the Bible. 
No, his claim is that Christianity is not meant as an objective doctrine at all, and so 
the paradox is intended to be exactly what it is. For Christianity does not want to be 
believed, or related to, in a rational fashion. Thus, it does not supply one with an 
undeniable proof of its truth, it instead categorically bereaves one of a way in which 
to relate to it rationally, by making an absurd claim the main part of its doctrine. 
 
To Kierkegaard therefore this paradoxicality does not represent a defect in the 
Christian doctrine. It is not the case that it merely invalidates its cogency. Not at all. It 
places its cogency on another plane, and it is intended to do precisely this. What the 
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paradox shows, or points towards, is that Christianity is an existential teaching.
16
 It 
seeks to relate to man on purely subjective and personal level, to the exclusion of 
objectivity. So that, in relation to man's belief in it, it is not concerned with the 
objectivity of this belief. With the belief's validity as regards any rational individual 
imaginable. Its interest lies with the state of conviction itself as it resides in every 
individual man, and the role that this belief has in view to this man’s overall view of 
the world. As God is the Absolute, the belief in God must be absolute, both in the 
sense of unwavering and in the sense of forever present. 
 
Now, normally the states of knowing something and being convinced of something 
are identifies with one another. The state of knowing something is normally see as the 
state of being rationally convinced of this something's truth. And there is nothing 
wrong with this picture. But, according to Kierkegaard, we can also meaningfully 
separate these two states from one another, by acknowledging the fact that knowledge 
is something necessarily rational and universal - in the sense that for knowledge to 
truly be knowledge it has to bear equal weight with any rational individual. Truth, in 
regard to knowledge, is not relative, and that is defining for knowledge as such. 
Whereas a state of conviction on the other hand, it needs not be rational at all - it 
could, for example, be an expression of an immense desire, a need to see the world in 
a certain way, or more relevantly, it could be the expression of faith. 
 
And this is exactly what Christianity values - faith in the above sense. Its message to 
mankind is simply that one ought to have faith in it - in God. And we can translate 
this by saying that Christianity, in Kierkegaard's interpretation, seeks to be an 
existential truth - it seeks to specifically be the object of a wholly subjective 
conviction. A truth that is a truth specifically for an existent, not a truth in itself, not 
an objective truth, but a subjective one. Something that in rational terms is not a truth 
at all. Hence, it also presents itself as a non-truth, as it does not seek to be one. 
 
In regard to this train thought, we must keep in mind that to Kierkegaard, there is no 
sharp demarcation line between his own philosophy and that of Christianity itself. All 
that he does is to his own mind to interpret Christianity for us in such a way as to get 
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us to relate to it at an authentic level. This has the consequence that the concept of 
faith that Kierkegaard himself develops is by him seen to be Christianity's concept of 
faith. Therefore we find in his presentation and reading of Christianity the very 
concept that he himself is the author of. As is seen above, where Kierkegaard's notion 
of an irrational state of belief and conviction is traced back to the central and 
paradoxical tenet of Christianity. Not directly, of course. But is found to be implicated 
in the paradoxicality, in the sense that in view of his concept of faith, this 
senselessness actually, on one level - the existential one - makes sense. 
 
Let us therefore, from this point, proceed by doing two things simultaneously. Firstly, 
we must look closer into the nature of the above mentioned implication. In how 
Kierkegaard find his concept of faith implicated in the manifest paradoxicality of 
God's birth in time. Secondly, and closely related to this, we must see in what sense 
the paradox of Christianity could appear before a subject as being something the 
subject feels it ought to believe in - even though it is absurd. 
 
This last thought can also be got at by raising the following question, which will be 
our actual point of departure: When we have understood that Christianity is 
manifestly absurd, why should we not simply disregard it? 
 
(In a sense I have already presented you with the answer to this, as I have pointed out 
that paradoxicality is necessary if an individual is to develop an absolute belief. But, 
in what follows, we are going to investigate this claim a little more closely, and from 
a new angle.) 
 
 
2.4 - The paradox of Christianity, the paradox of existence 
 
The reason that we ought not to disregard Christianity on account of its absurdity is 
that this absurdity itself, in virtue of its structure, takes on a very important aspect 
when viewed in relation to the nature of our own subjectivity. The absurdity may 
seem nothing but nonsensical and as a piece of faulty logic on its own, but when 
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compared to our subjective nature, it discloses itself as an image of the very 
paradoxicality that we find to be part of ourselves as subjective beings. 
 
The paradox of Christianity is namely structurally identical to the paradox that 
characterizes and defines our own individual existence. 
 
Before I undertake to prove how this is the case, or at least show how Kierkegaard 
can come to believe that it is so, I want to make a remark regarding the 
communicative strategy that Christianity here employs - in Kierkegaard's reading of 
it. I mean its strategy of supplying us with a paradox that is objectively self-refuting, 
but that is nonetheless meant to speak to us in virtue of an element that it itself does 
not supply, or mention - our own subjective condition, as explained above. Said 
differently: Why does not Christianity, or Kierkegaard, do what I am doing right now 
- attempting to explain its position meticulously and to the word? 
 
It does not do this for a very good reason, namely in order to enable an individual that 
approaches it to have the opportunity to relate to it on his own, and not in virtue of an 
interpretation imposed upon him. As I am now doing to you. For if you come to see 
that I am right in what I am saying here, then the notion of subjectivity that is crucial 
to the interpretation of Christianity that is produced here, will not be wholly your 
own, but will be influenced by mine. And for the intent of Kierkegaard and 
Christianity to be fully realized, the notion of subjectivity that is involved in the 
interpretation has to be fully individual to the person that is interpreting. Each and 
every one of us has to understand and relate to the Christian doctrine in virtue of his 
own singular and subjective existence. It is because of this that Kierkegaard speaks of 
Christianity as inherently existential. 
 
The thought behind this strategy is therefore the wish to communicate a message, or 
truth - the truth that God is the Absolute - without overriding the subject that it speaks 
to. So as to enable the subject to relate to God in virtue of his own singular existence. 
Vide the following quote, for example: "Den subjektive religieuse Tænker derfor, der 
for at være dette har fattet Tilværelsens Dobbelthed, indseer let, at den ligefremme 
Meddelelse er et Bedrag mod Gud (der bedrager ham muligen for et andet Menneskes 
Tilbedelse i Sandhed), et Bedrag mod sig selv (som var han ophørt at være 
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existerende), et Bedrag mod et andet Menneske (som muligen kun faaer et relativt 
Gudsforhold), et Bedrag, der bringer ham i Modsigelse med hele hans Tænkning."
17
 
Followingly, it does not want to simply tell a subject the truth, for that would mean 
that the subject in question would have to relate to this truth as if were an objective 
truth - as if it were the kind of truth that belongs to the world exterior to the subject, 
and that it has to conform to in order to relate properly to this world. For any subject, 
we can meaningfully distinguish reality into two fundamentally different categories: 
The I and what belongs to the I, and the non-I, or the world at large. The point is that 
if Christianity presented itself as an objective truth, it would belong to the non-I. And 
it would cause the subject to relate to it in the same manner that the subject relates to 
any feature of the non-I. Followingly, it would not be an existential truth - a truth 
inherently valid for the subject by virtue of being the singular subject that it is. The 
subject would instead relate to it in the degree that the world at large demanded of it 
that it should relate to it. 
 
In this regard, compare the following quote: "Den objektive Reflexions Vei gjør 
Subjektet til det Tilfældige og derved Existents til et Ligegyldigt, Forsvindende. Bort 
fra Subjektet gaaer Veien til den objektive Sandhed, og medens Subjektet og 
Subjektiviteten bliver ligegyldig, bliver Sandheden det ogsaa, netop dette er dens 
objektive Gyldighed, thi Interessen er, ligesom Afgjørelsen, Subjektiviteten."
18
 
 
By utilizing the strategy that it does, however, Christianity escapes this scenario. It 
does not force its truth upon the subject through some exterior authority, instead it 
attempts to get the subject to recognize itself in the message that it is giving. To make 
it find itself and its own situation represented in it, and so to get it to relate to it by 
means of a mechanism of identification. Christianity wants simply to show itself to be 
of the same nature as the subject, and therefore to naturally belong with it. And it does 
this by means of the paradox - which, I have said, is structurally identical to the 
paradox that characterizes subjective existence. 
 
Now, we have seen what Kierkegaard views as the paradoxicality of Christianity - 
that the eternal truth has come into being at a specific point in time. What then is the 
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paradoxicality of our existence that causes us, or should cause us, to identify with 
Christianity? 
 
Our paradoxicality is that we are at the one and the same time both infinite and finite, 
both eternal and temporal.
19
 We are finite and temporal in the sense that we are all 
born at a certain point in time, and that we all die at a later point. But also in the sense 
that this mortality causes us to have limits on the numbers of experiences that we are 
able to have, and, dependent on when, and into what kind of society we are born, also 
on the nature of these experiences. The range of what we can relate to, both 
emotionally and epistemically, is hence a function of a greater natural and historical 
totality, to which we belong as a mere contingent atom, and to which we do not stand 
in a position to fully relate. This last remark is meant to convey the fact that we 
cannot, epistemically speaking, transcend, or step outside of the limited realm of our 
actual experiences, and see the whole of reality, both social and natural, perched from 
a top outside of it. To think that we are able to do this, that we, as subjective beings, 
are able to disregard our own subjectivity and experience the world objectively, as if 
we were not a part of it, is a misunderstanding. We, as subjective beings, cannot 
disregard our own subjectivity, for this would mean that we should disregard 
ourselves and who we are - which automatically would bring up the question of who 
then is experiencing the world, since it cannot be us. Which of course brings us back 
to the point: We cannot experience the world objectively, because we, as subjective 
beings, are subjective. Which is what is meant by Kierkegaard’s often quoted adage: 
"Sandheden er Subjektiviteten."
20
 
 
To appreciate this inherently a skeptical position that Kierkegaard places himself in, 
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take into consideration the following, rather lengthy, quote: "Man hører i vor Tid ofte 
nok tale om det Negative og om negative Tænkere, og hører ofte nok de Positives 
Præken i den Anledning og deres Takkebønner til Gud og Hegel, at de ikke ere som 
hine Negative, men ere blevne Positive. Det Positive i Forhold til Tænkning lader sig 
henføre til disse Bestemmelser: sandselig Vished, historisk Viden, speculativt 
Resultat. Men dette Positive er netop det Usande. Den sandselige Vished er Svig (cfr. 
den græske Skepsis og den hele Fremstilling i den nyere Philosophie, hvoraf man kan 
lære saare Meget); den historiske Viden er Sandsebedrag (da den er Approximations-
Viden); og det speculative Resultat er Blendværk. Alt dette Positive udtrykker nemlig 
ikke det erkjendende Subjekts Tilstand i Existentsen, det angaaer derfor et fingeret 
objektivt Subjekt, og at forvexle sig selv med et saadant er at blive og at være narret. 
Ethvert Subjekt er et existerende Subjekt, og derfor maa dette væsentligen udtrykke 
sig i al hans Erkjenden og udtrykke sig som forhindrende den i illusorisk Afslutning i 
Sandse-Vished, i historisk Viden, i illusorisk Resultat. I historisk Viden faaer han en 
Mængde at vide om Verden, Intet om sig selv, bevæger sig bestandigt i 
Approximations-Videns Sphære, medens han ved sin formeentlige Positivitet bilder 
sig ind at have Visheden, som dog kun haves i Uendeligheden, i hvilken han dog som 
existerende ikke kan være, men bestandigt ankomme. Intet Historisk kan blive mig 
uendelig vist, undtagen dette, at jeg er til (hvilket igjen ikke kan blive uendelig vist 
for noget andet Individ, der atter kun saaledes er uendeligt vidende om sin egen 
Tilværelse), hvilket ikke er noget Historisk. Det speculative Resultat er forsaavidt 
Illusion, som det existerende Subjekt vil tænkende abstrahere fra at det er existerende 
og være sub specie æterni. 
 
De Negative have derfor bestandigt den Fordeel, at de have noget Positivt, dette 
nemlig, at de ere opmærksomme paa det Negative; de Positive have slet Intet, thi de 
ere bedragne. 'etop fordi det 'egative er tilstede i Tilværelsen og er overalt tilstede 
(thi Tilværelse, Existents er bestandig i Vorden), derfor gjelder det som den eneste 
Frelse derimod at blive bestandigt opmærksom derpaa. Ved at blive positivt 
betrygget er Subjektet netop narret."21 
 
It should, of course, be noted that Kierkegaard, in his skeptical position, is not flatly 
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denying the possibility of an objective understanding of the world as such. Only that 
this cannot be had by existing creatures, but is the purview of divine and purely 
infinite beings, like God, whom are exempt from existing in the flux of existence - in 
the state of continual becoming and change that characterizes our lot. For God, the 
world would appear as a given and closed totality, for he perceives it from the point of 
view of eternity (infinity), but for us, we who are finite parts of this world, the 
sequence of events that constitutes it, is not at all closed or finished. We are forced to 
view it from the restricted perspective that is given to us - and no totality can disclose 
itself from within a segment of this totality's own development towards its finished 
state. That would be like if a note in a symphony had the power to hear the full score. 
For us, therefore, the world is not closed, but is always on the verge of becoming 
something other than it now is. It is always slipping into the next note, and we with 
it.
22
 
 
Our finity (a neologism, but you catch the drift), therefore, can be said to be 
constituted by all the possible ways in which there exists boundaries for our avenues 
of experience, and the ways in which we are forced, by external circumstances, to 
relate to certain phenomenons, and not others, in our day to day life. Finity relates to 
the ways in which we, as persons, are determined by things that we are unable to 
control - the ways in which we are given a definite form by exterior circumstances, 
and are, so to speak, the product of objective physiological and socio-historical 
factors. 
 
Our infinity, on the other hand, is the element that is fixed and permanent throughout 
all of the changes that we undergo in our lives. Increasing age and exposure to 
differing social milieus, the varying amount of use expected of our bodies, intellectual 
and artistic influences, changes in fashion, in customs and in other social institutions, 
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and in our more general rank and position in the larger order of the social hierarchy - 
all of these factors, in addition to more of their kind, cause us to change from year to 
year, physically and mentally. They cause us to view things from new perspectives, to 
gain new opinions, to find beauty in objects that we before thought of as bland and 
uninspiring, and to find that old things now have grown so worn and so familiar that 
we cannot obtain a single spark of enjoyment out of contemplating them. We become, 
plain and simply, different persons, and we experience that we, in regard to our 
attitudes and propensities, vary throughout the space of our life. And yet, we still in an 
important sense remain the same. It is, more or less, as if all of these changes take 
place in a fixed medium, and as if they are modifications of a self-identical substance. 
A primordial I if you will, or more to the point, the form and framework of an I that is 
given its content through its interaction with the world. So that if were to draw an 
analogy and speak of the I, or the self, as a painting: The infinite would be the canvas, 
while the finite would be the colours. And as the colours fade and change with time, 
or maybe are painted over, there can still be said to be a sense of continuity to the 
object in itself - and this continuity is what I believe Kierkegaard to term "the 
infinite". The part of us that does not change, and that is capable of cloaking itself in 
an endless number of appearances. It is the part of us that allows us to grow different 
from ourselves, while still remaining the same.
23
 
 
Let me now quote from a relevant passage in the journals, which is the most 
straightforward remark I have found Kierkegaard to make on the matter at hand - 
though mind you, in this remark Kierkegaard does not keep strictly to the description 
of human nature as a synthesis of the finite and infinite, but speaks of it both as a 
synthesis of the metaphysical and the contingent, and as a synthesis of the divinely 
necessary and the contingently finite, but all of these syntheses amounts to the same, 
as they all are relations between something anchored and something coincidental, 
something fixed and something fleeting - that is, when seen abstractly, they have an 
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identical structure: "Denne Eenhed af det Metaph: og det Tilfældige ligger allerede i 
Selvbevidstheden, det er Personlighedens Udgangspunkt. Jeg bliver mig paa eengang 
bevidst i min evige Gyldighed i min saa at sige guddommelige Nødv:, og i min 
tilfældige Endelighed (at jeg er dette bestemte Væsen, født i dette Land, til denne Tid, 
under alle disse vexlende Omgivelsers mangeartede Indflytelse). Og denne sidste Side 
skal ikke oversees og ikke vrages, men Individets sande Liv er dens Apotheose, der 
ikke bestaaer i, at det tomme indholdsløse Jeg ligesom lister sig ud af denne 
Endelighed, for at forflygtiges og bortdunste paa sin himmelske udvandring, men at 
det Gudd. iboer og finder sig ind i Endeligheden."
24
 
 
The passage relates, as you see, only incidentally to our discussion, as its full content 
concerns Kierkegaard's view on how one ought to live ("Individets sande Liv") to put 
it bluntly, and this will not concern us, at least not yet. In the context of our 
discussion, the important thing to notice is how the different concepts are used to 
describe human nature, and how they are correlated to each other. The finite is 
correlated to the contingent socio-historical factors ("dette Land", "denne tid", "disse 
vexlende Omgivelsers"), while the metaphysical is correlated to one's eternal surety 
(of one's own being) by force of one's, so to speak, divine necessity ("min evige 
Gyldighed i min saa at sige guddommelige Nødv:"), and, moreover, to what he speaks 
of as our empty, blank I ("det tomme indholdsløse Jeg"). And he also says, right at the 
beginning of the passage, the these two contradictory components are together the 
mainspring of the personality ("Personlighedens Udgangspunkt").  
 
All of this corroborates nicely with the picture I was attempting to draw of the 
meaning of finity and infinity as the two complementary components of the human 
being. One factor that is contingent and beyond the control of the subject itself, and 
which, moreover, is the one that properly defines the subject as a specific someone - 
the finite. And another factor, the infinite, which is the substance in which the former 
factor resides and evolves. 
 
Further textual evidence of this picture can be found in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift, where Kierkegaard at one point states the following: "Den Negativitet der 
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er i Tilværelsen, eller rettere det existerende Subjekts Negativitet (hvilken hans 
Tænkning maa væsentligen gjengive i en adæqvat Form), er grundet i Subjektets 
Synthese, at det er en existerende uendelig Aand. Uendeligheden og det Evige er det 
eneste Visse, men idet det er i Subjektet, er det i Tilværelsen, og det første Udtryk 
derfor er dets Svig og denne uhyre Modsigelse, at det Evige vorder, at det bliver til."
25
 
 
Again, the passage relates only incidentally to our discussion, but that aside, we again 
find that the remarks he makes regarding human nature add up to the picture 
presented. The subject is in the passage described as an existing infinite spirit, and the 
infinite is, coincidentally, described as the only thing that is absolutely certain for the 
subject. This relates to the fact that the infinite is that in us which always stays the 
same, no matter how much we change. It is what allows a subject to recognize itself 
throughout the great deal of different guises that one develops. It is, quite simply, the 
factor of our constitution that enables us to be self-conscious.
26
 This connection 
between the infinite and selfhood can, moreover, be verified by something that 
Kierkegaard states in the passage that precedes the passage just quoted, where he 
says: "Intet Historisk kan blive mig uendelig vist, undtagen dette, at jeg er til (hvilket 
igjen ikke kan blive uendelig vist for noget andet Individ, der atter kun saaledes er 
uendeligt vidende om sin egen Tilværelse), hvilket ikke er noget Historisk."
27
 For as 
one puts these two quotes together, it becomes clear that one's infiniteness and the 
bare fact of one's existence are the only two things that one can know for certain. 
Which is, of course, because they are, in a sense, the same. My infinity being that 
which provides me with a fixed, but empty, self-identity, and that thereby lets me 
relate to my dynamic and plastic existence as always my own. 
 
The first passage quoted above from Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift in this 
context goes, furthermore, on to state that since a subject is part infinite, and 
simultaneously is existing, it finds itself to be in an enormous contradiction. For in as 
much as it is infinite it is eternally self-identical, and in as much as it is existing, it is 
locked in a process of continual becoming and change. It is therefore something 
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unchangeable that continually changes. It is at the one and the same time both the one, 
and the other. Both something firm and something plastic. Which is impossible, but 
nonetheless the case. 
 
There are two things to remark in regard to this: Firstly, we here again see the 
dichotomy between the finite and the infinite, and their particular roles and functions, 
that I described earlier. But secondly, we see that the paradox of the Christianity - that 
the eternal has come into being at a specific point in time - is structurally the same as 
the paradox of our existence. As both paradoxes are made up of an eternal, or infinite 
element, and a temporal, or finite element, that are fused into a solid, but 
contradictory whole. One states that God, that is infinite, has come into being at a 
specific point in time. The other that we, who also are infinite, are locked in a state of 
continual becoming and contingency. The point of both is that something atemporal 
has been made a part of the realm of the temporal - which is impossible, but 
nonetheless the case. 
 
Having established this point of intersection in between Christianity and the nature of 
existence, let us next ask ourselves the questions: What does it mean? And what 
impact does Kierkegaard imagine this structural correspondence to have? 
 
 
2.5 - The Absolute 
 
The answer to both of these questions is found in relation to the Absolute, to every 
individual's need for an Absolute, and to the prima facie lack of an Absolute in every 
individual's life - which is another way of approaching the phenomenon of despair 
that I have described earlier on. 
 
If we now were to follow Kierkegaard in his existential and epistemic depiction of 
human nature as I have outlined it for you, we could formulate the kernel of his 
picture as the thought that human beings are naturally unwhole. They are, or we are, 
partly of the same substance as God. We are infinite. But simultaneously by virtue of 
our finiteness and existence, we are forced to be part of a world that vastly exceeds 
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our power of comprehension and our ability to control the objects around us. We are 
hence limitless in our relation to ourselves (that is to say that we are something that 
we ourselves cannot fall out of touch with, as there is nothing that is able to limit our 
own relation to ourselves. This is not to imply that our own psyche is perfectly 
transparent to us - Kierkegaard would categorically deny such a view), and 
simultaneously limited in our ability to influence and know the greater totality that we 
form a part of, and which invariably form a part of who we are. We are, to use a 
metaphor, like a solid piece of rock that just barely rises above the surface of a 
constantly raging sea, far away from any coastline. All that we can see and relate to 
are the clouds that skim over us far above, and the waves that perpetually rise and fall 
with chaotic motions all around us. There is nothing fixed for us to lock ourselves in 
on other than ourselves. All is change and motion, except for our own existence. So 
that we as an individual always seem to outlive whatever object we happen to come 
into an emotional relation with. We can find no stability in our surroundings that 
matches our own. 
 
This state of our nature has the effect that we at the one and the same time know what 
the Absolute is without actually possessing it. As we ourselves are intimations of an 
Absolute, given our constant and unchanging presence to ourselves, and there is 
nothing we can find exterior to us that complements our own constancy. We are like 
the rock, something enduring, forced into relationship with ephemeral waves and 
fleeting clouds. 
 
Our unwholeness is our lack of an infinity that complements, or completes, our own. 
And because a complementary infinite is lacking, whatever we then identify ourselves 
with, whatever we erect as an ideal for what we want to be, it involves something 
finite. It is of the nature of the waves or the clouds. And it is just this ephemeral and 
transitory nature of our ideals, and our consciousness of them as being ephemeral and 
transitory, that could be said to be the mainspring of despair.
28
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Kierkegaard, in Sygdommen til Døden, gives the example of a girl that despairs out of 
love. She despairs because her beloved is dead, or has been her unfaithful - the exact 
nature does not matter he says. The point is that no matter why she despairs, she does 
not in any case really despair over the loss - she despairs over herself. That she fails 
her ideal, which was to be this man's beloved. She despairs because she still sees 
herself as his beloved, because this has become her self - the ideal by which she 
relates to herself. Yet she knows that she is not this man's beloved. Hence she is not 
who she wants to be. She is despair.
29
 
 
And she is despair, because she identified herself with something treacherous - 
another person. She constructed her self on the basis of him, who is categorically 
different from her in view of her singularity, and who is, from her epistemic and 
existential situation, a part of the totality of the world that encloses her. He is of the 
substance of the waves and the clouds, to use the metaphor I used above. Of course, it 
needed not happen that he betrayed her. There was no necessity in this. And the 
particular despair she experiences is nothing but an effect of this contingency. But, as 
Kierkegaard remarks, even if she had got him, even if she had become who she 
wanted to be - his beloved, she would still be despair.  
 
Quote: "... dette Selv er hende nu en Plage, naar det skal være et Selv uden 'ham'; 
dette Selv, der var blevet hende, forøvrigt i en anden Forstand ligesaa fortvivlet, 
hendes Rigdom, er nu blevet hende en motbydelig Tomhed, da 'han' er død, eller det 
er blevet hende en Afsky, da det minder hende om, at hun er bedragen."
30
 
 
And she would have been despair, whether she succeeded, or not, whether she got to 
be his beloved, or not - because the possibility would always exist that she woke up 
one morning and was it no longer. The structure of her self would dependent be upon 
another person - on something exterior to herself that lies outside of her control, and 
that is the target of influences that she cannot hope to know the full extent of. It is, as 
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I have mentioned earlier, that the state that negates the state of despair is a categorical 
negation. It negates the very possibility of despair. So that if that possibility still 
exists, if the mere possibility exists that one will fail one's own ideal - one still is in a 
state of despair: "Det ikke at være fortvivlet maa betyde den tilintetgjorte Mulighed af 
at kunne være det; hvis det skal være sandt, at et Menneske ikke er fortvivlet, maa han 
i ethvert Øieblik tilintetgjøre Muligheden."
31
 
 
The main point of the above is that one will always have that possibility of falling into 
despair if one's ideal is tied up with the world exterior to one. As Kierkegaard attests: 
"Men det er en Modsigelse at ville absolut noget Endeligt, da det Endelige jo maa 
faae en Ende, og der altsaa maa komme en Tid da det ikke mere kan villes."
32
 There is 
nothing Absolute in this world, and hence there is nothing in it that is able to 
complement the infinity that remains a part of our nature. 
 
In order to get around this, and find something secure that one can relate to oneself by 
without running the risk of falling into despair, one has to find an ideal that does not 
depend upon anything worldly or social. One has to transcend the finite. But how does 
one do that? Especially seeing as one cannot, according to Kierkegaard, transcend, 
and leave behind, the perspective offered one as a part of one's existence. It is a part 
of one, for good or for worse. And it is, actually, a form of despair to attempt to 
ignore it. For one would then erect an ideal for oneself that would be manifestly 
contradicted by every one of one's experiences. As one actually is finite, and one 
actually is caught up in the horizon of one's own particular existence. 
 
The answer to this is that one has to have faith. And faith is an unconditional and 
irrational belief in a transcendental Absolute - in God. To Kierkegaard, this represents 
the only possible access that an existent being can have to something infinite. And it 
is a purely indirect access, a negative leap.  
 
Now let us see if we can imagine to ourselves how an individual might be drawn 
towards Christianity with the preceding reflections in mind, and I believe it would 
take place as something along the following lines: If a person that is aware of his own 
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epistemic and existential situation approaches Christianity, he will come upon a 
doctrine that structurally corresponds to his own situation. As the paradox at its core 
is structurally identical, in the explained sense, to the paradoxicality inherent in 
himself. Furthermore, he will come upon a doctrine that claims to be absolute, but that 
has no pretensions about appearing to be absolute. No, quite to the contrary. It appears 
instead as manifestly absurd. But by being this, it would, I imagine, strike this 
individual as being first and foremost honest. As he knows that he cannot relate 
positively to an Absolute given the nature of who and what he is. So, in response, it 
would appear to him, that this doctrine does not attempt to convince him of it either. 
Instead it sets up faith for faith's sake as the ideal by which it judges him. It is not 
interested in reasons, and in reasons for belief - as science and philosophy are. But in 
the state of belief itself, and in belief as an absolute condition - an ideal state of the 
psyche, the state of not being in despair. The Christian doctrine gives him a picture, in 
which the important is not how, or why one believes - but in that he believes. And, 
what is more, in that he believes. It reasons to him on the level of his existential 
situation. Not on the level of objectivity. It gives him, quite plainly, an alternative to 
the state of lacking an infinite counterpoint, by introducing the notion of faith. The 
notion that he, just as that, should believe in such an Absolute as it gives him. No 
questions asked. 
 
The impetus that moves us to faith, that motivates us to immerse ourselves in the 
paradox of Christianity, and not to disregard it, is thus not a consequence of having 
come to grips with some truth - it is not a response to a reason that is intersubjectively 
accessible. It is done because we have come to see that we need an Absolute in order 
to remedy our own subjective existential plight. And it is in this sense, an act that is 
utterly subjective. 
 
But because the choice is made in view to relieving ourselves permanently of despair, 
the choice of Christianity as an Absolute, will to an impartial observer - and to us here 
and now that are attempting to understand this process - invariably appear as arbitrary. 
Arbitrary, in the first instance, because it is by no means uniquely Christianity that 
can fulfil this function as a remedy. And arbitrary, in the second instance, because the 
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choice of Christianity rests upon a wholly contingent historical situation, in which the 
subject happened to stumble upon exactly this doctrine, and not any other. For even 
though Christianity, as I have tried to show by elaborating its paradoxical structure, 
has a certain affinity with the subject's existential situation, and thereby is in a 
position to relate to the subject by making him, or her, identify with it - this does by 
no means qualify it as the only possible solution to the subject's fundamental problem. 
Once one relates to the whole picture, and sees the mechanisms that are at work here, 
one will also come to the understanding that even if faith, understood as an absolute 
belief, is the answer, the question: "Why should it be a Christian faith? And why not 
another form?", remains unanswered. 
 
This might seem like a devastating objection against Kierkegaard's project. But I 
believe that Kierkegaard would have said, had he spoken as I openly as I am now 
attempting to, that the presence of this arbitrariness is necessary. For without it as a 
component, the commitment given by the individual would not be wholly free. It 
would, on some level, instead be guided by a reason. An influence that persuades it 
that the individual ought to choose Christianity. And this would make the belief that 
the individual acquires rational - which would mean that it is a conditional belief, and 
hence, not absolute. It would not be faith. 
 
In order to acquire faith, the choice of what one believes in has to be, objectively 
speaking, arbitrary, for it has to be an essential expression of one's own subjectivity. 
And what better to believe in then, than the most absurd doctrine imaginable? If one 
first has to focus, I mean, on the act of belief, instead of the object, or the 
propositional content of the belief, why not believe in something that objectively and 
under no sane circumstances should be believed? The mere foolishness of such an 
attempt may actually cause one to become able to see it through - by bringing out the 
devil in one. I mean, it is not uncommon for people to become incited by the prospect 
of being able to do something that it is thought cannot be done. That's how the highest 
mountains are climbed, and experimental theses formed. And just this sort of obstacle 
is present here, as it is rationally thought that such a doctrine as Christianity cannot be 
believed, and shouldn't be believed. So, defy rationality. Make a spontaneous step, but 
make it without qualms or second-thoughts, make it whole-heartedly and defiantly in 
face of reason, and make it passionately, as an expression of who one is and what one 
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is capable of. Such a step is a leap of faith. 
 
But, it is not the case, as it might seem to be, that this demand for arbitrariness makes 
Christianity into any more of an obvious choice for a man consciously seeking an 
Absolute. I mean, one could certainly find doctrines that are just as paradoxical and 
absurd as it is, and which it would be just as foolhardy to believe in. And in the end, I 
believe there is nothing more to be said about this dilemma, other than that it is a 
necessary dilemma, and that it cannot be resolved. For there is no rational reason to 
believe in Christianity. Christianity cannot objectively be believed to be true, and it 
possesses no trait that makes it understandable that one would choose it over any 
other form of transcendental Absolute. Had there existed such a trait, or been 
objectively clear that it was the truth, then faith would be impossible - and, as 
Kierkegaard says in Frygt and Bæven, Abraham would be lost. The absoluteness of 
faith presupposes instead that the choice to believe is made from a position of 
absolute doubt. It is this origin that secures that the belief created becomes impossible 
to contest - and hence, absolute. And it gains this attribute, not because every 
contesting view is guaranteed to be false, as would be the case with an objective 
Absolute, but because it becomes meaningless to contest it. The faith is absurd, just as 
absurd as the doctrine that it is a faith in, and to say of it that it is manifestly false is to 
be correct, furthermore, the man of faith knows that already. It is, for him, redundant 
to draw attention to it. The point is no longer whether the belief is correct, or not. It is 
not a question of correctness. It is a question of having an Absolute, or not. And if the 
only possible way to gain it is by irrational means, and you truly comprehend your 
existential situation, you truly comprehend how you are thrown to despair if you lack 
it, then the irrational is a lesser evil.  
 
As you see, it is quite easy to objectively understand the need for an Absolute, hence 
the need for faith. But what is impossible to understand, and by that I mean to place 
under a general law of behaviour, is the actual subjective situation of gaining faith, of 
choosing to believe in the Christian God and mythos - because this invariably is an 
arbitrary choice, as it is not informed by a reason that necessitates it. 
 
Faith is an irrationality, because it is built on an irrationality, and it is this irrationality 
that gives it its absoluteness. 
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2.6 - The problem of the necessity of the irrational 
 
I hope that the preceding pages have made it more evident as to why Kierkegaard 
believes that the paradoxical structure of Christianity ought to fascinate an individual, 
and not make him disregard it. As I have said, it ought to fascinate because its 
paradoxical structure corresponds to the one that characterizes the individual's own 
existence, so that an individual ought to feel a kind of kinship between himself and it. 
Furthermore, I also hope I have made it sufficiently evident to which degree the 
process of faith can be objectively understood at all. As I have said above, one can 
understand the reason that an individual is drawn towards faith, but one cannot 
understand why he chooses actually to believe absolutely in anything specific. That is, 
one can understand the subject's need for an Absolute, but one cannot objectively 
understand how the subject can actually come to take Christianity, or anything else, as 
an Absolute. And we cannot understand this, because there objectively speaking does 
not exist anything objectively true for the subject as we understand it. The subject 
being, as I have said, always epistemically limited by the horizon of his own finite 
existence, and therefore forever closed off from direct contact with anything infinite 
and eternal (other than its own infinity, of course). This means that even though we 
can understand the subject can come to feel a kind of attraction to Christianity, we 
also understand that this attraction is not rational. For had the subject in question been 
confronted by another doctrine other Christianity, but one that was formed just as 
Christianity is formed upon an essential paradox between the infinite and the finite, 
the subject would have, to use the vocabulary of infatuation, fallen for that doctrine 
instead. 
 
But, remarkably enough, this situation yet again constitutes a paradox of a like nature 
as the one we find in the subject's existential situation and in the doctrine of 
Christianity itself. A paradox formed by something infinite being coupled with 
something finite, something necessary with something contingent. For the fact that 
one chances upon Christianity, and furthermore that one chances to be taken in by it - 
something that is far from easy, given the nature of this whole chapter - and that, in 
addition to this, this event, which is nothing if not a contingent event, should then lead 
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up to the individual acquiring a relation to an Absolute, that is paradoxical. It is 
paradoxical because such an event would mean that something Absolute - something 
eternal, infinite and unlimited, resulted out of a process that only involved finite, 
limited and contingent elements. It would mean, to reason by analogy, that the 
conclusion reached by no means was contained in the premises. A situation that 
corresponds to the one depicted in the New Testament where the Eternal God is born 
out of a mortal woman's womb, for the conclusion was here also, by no means a 
product of its premises. To sum up: Again, one has a paradox based upon a relation 
between the temporal and the atemporal. And of the type that one is to expect to 
encounter when a finite being attempts to relate to something infinite. Just the type of 
paradox that Christianity draws attention to. 
 
Now, I would hesitate to say that this new paradox makes it any more rational to 
believe in Christianity, or brings something new into the imagined subject's relation to 
Christianity. But what it does do, is give us a strengthened sense of the elegance that 
inheres in the Christian doctrine as Kierkegaard portrays it. The manner in which it 
makes sense of the nonsensical. As it manages to make the element of arbitrariness 
into a necessary part of its theory of faith, Christianity gains a power of attraction that 
should not be underestimated. It becomes at the one and the same time an object that 
rationally repulses the subject, and that attracts because the arbitrariness and 
irrationality can be seen to be elements of a greater totality that actually makes sense. 
 
I believe that we ought to see this situation of a simultaneous attraction-repulsion to 
Christianity along the following lines: It repulses one in as much as one realizes the 
absurdity of every one of three paradoxes involved. But it attracts one in as much as 
one understands the fact that Christianity counters the claim that it is absurd and 
paradoxical, and that coming to believe in it is absurd and paradoxical, by claiming 
that this absurdity and this paradoxicality is wholly necessary in order for the subject 
to gain an Absolute, given the nature of the subject's existence. 
 
This then, presents us with our last difficulty - at least the last one I will treat here. 
And it is something that I touched upon at the end of the preceding section, where I 
spoke of the problem that the Christian doctrine of faith makes a virtue out of its own 
absurdity, and thereby subordinates the irrationality of the choice to a greater rational 
  42 
whole. 
 
For if it is the case, as I have now portrayed it, that the Christian doctrine should 
cause a subject to believe in it precisely because Christianity itself has succeeded in 
incorporating in its doctrine the difficulties that arise in regard to believing in it, 
because it makes the arbitrariness - which is the difficulty in question and which it is 
necessarily a victim of - into a presupposition for gaining faith, then would not this 
arbitrariness turn, paradoxically enough, into something necessary? For would it not 
give the subject ample reason to embrace the arbitrariness, by showing him that this is 
the only way he could ever reach an Absolute? Followingly, would not the choice he 
makes in the leap of faith - where he chooses to believe in God - be guided by his 
desire for the Absolute and his awareness of his own finite existence, so that this 
absolute belief that he achieves through the choice actually becomes conditioned upon 
this desire and this understanding of his own finite existential situation? The end 
result being that the choice looses its arbitrariness and irrationality? 
 
In one sense this does happen. The choice of faith is guided by an understanding of 
the nature of one's own existence and by an understanding of the necessity of making 
a free and irrational choice and commitment in order to acquire true faith. But what 
we have to keep clear to ourselves here, is that the choice of faith is a commitment to 
believe in the truth of Christianity. It is a commitment to believe in God. And as one 
stands before this question: "Does God exist?", one does not win any advantage by 
being aware that one cannot possibly know this, and furthermore, by being aware that 
all that one can hope for in regard to any kind of resolution to this question, is to reach 
a state of irrational conviction. And of course, the choice of faith is made guided by 
the desire to reach this state, and by a knowledge of its nature. But this does not help 
one in the actual choice. God does not win any more reality by being necessary in 
order for a subject to escape despair. It is not given that the subject is meant to. What 
we see here is instead the reason that motivates the subject into making the choice - he 
wants to escape despair - not a reason that informs that choice. And the difference is 
crucial. 
 
The reason that motivates is a kind of meta-situational conviction. The conviction that 
one has to have faith in order to escape despair, and that it therefore is necessary to 
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believe in God. But, and this is the important part, this does not make it any more 
evident that it is objectively rational to believe in the existence of God and the truth of 
his teaching. God does not become any more true, just because we need him. And that 
one chooses to believe in him is still objectively a paradox - but subjectively 
understandable. 
 
Connected with this is of course also the consideration that it is Christianity itself that, 
at least to Kierkegaard's own mind, puts forward the theory of faith that he expounds. 
The idea of a state of absolute belief not created as a response to a convincing reason, 
but through a free choice and commitment - for remember, Christianity itself has at its 
heart a fundamental paradox that makes it rationally impossible to objectively believe 
in its truth. Nonetheless, it claims to be the truth - with a capital "t". And also to 
deliver unto man the highest good attainable - the state of blessedness. Which is the 
state of not being in despair, vide, for example, the following quote from Sygdommen 
til Døden: "Muligheden af denne Sygdom er Menneskets Fortrin for Dyret; at være 
opmærksom paa denne Sygdom er den Christnes Fortrin for det naturlige Menneske; 
at være helbredet fra denne Sygdom den Christnes Salighed."
33
 In which the sickness 
he speaks of is despair, and where he explicitly states that the advantage that a 
Christian attains by being Christian, by believing in God, is to escape this sickness. 
 
The end result being that Christianity itself holds within it precisely the idea that we 
here describe of the absurdity and simultaneous necessity of faith. And it is here that 
the elegance and the attraction of Christianity lies. That it presents itself with full 
awareness of the impossibility that it demands, that you should believe in its truth, but 
that it succeeds in presenting this impossibility as a rational reaction to the existential 
plight that every subject necessarily finds itself to be in. 
 
But still, this self-awareness on part of the Christian doctrine and the fact that it 
accurately captures the subject's existential situation, does not make the reality of God 
any more objectively certain. It only opens up a natural route whereby one can come 
to connect to it on a personal level, as one would connect to a person that shows 
himself to be sufficiently similar to oneself. 
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This, I hope, is sufficient to answer the question raised. The leap of faith does make 
sense in as much as it is seen as a reaction to despair. And in accordance with the fact 
that faith becomes absolute, becomes faith, only if it originates in a free and arbitrary 
choice, this arbitrariness does become, in a sense, necessary in order to avoid despair. 
But this does not in way settle the matter that is primarily at stake in the leap of faith, 
namely the existence of God. For even though one realizes that there are benefits 
connected to a belief in God, these benefits are incidental to the question at hand, and 
they are in no foreseeable manner able to function as premises to the effect that God 
exists. Hence, the choice to believe in the existence of God is still a free choice. It is 
not informed by any relevant reason. 
 
 
2.7 - The second step 
 
This brings us at last to the second step in what I have called the twofold process of 
faith. We have up to this seen, firstly, what constitutes the first step, which is to 
immerse oneself into a state of absolute doubt. A state in which one is torn between 
one's existential need for the Absolute, and one's rational conviction that it is 
impossible to relate to anything Absolute. Secondly, we have investigated the 
question as to why one would immerse oneself in such doubt, and the effect that the 
answer to this question has for the process of faith itself. We have also seen how it is 
crucial to faith that it originates through a wholly free choice. Since it is this freedom, 
this lack of dependency upon rational grounds informing the choice, that secures the 
outcome as absolute and unchangeable - immune to correction from further evidence. 
And, lastly, we have seen that it is in order to enable the subject to make this wholly 
free choice that the state of doubt is necessary. 
 
In this section, it is the actual act of making this free choice that I propose we look at. 
 
Now, as we have already been made aware, though the choice to believe has to be a 
free choice, it is nonetheless not a wholly spontaneous choice, which can be made 
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whenever and wherever. It has to grow out of a specific circumstance. Namely, the 
circumstance that one commits to a belief without the guidance of a reason that 
informs the belief and secures its validity. For it is in this very sense that the 
commitment is "free", that it is an independent act on behalf of the subject vis-à-vis 
his own understanding and the objective world surrounding him. It is a wholly 
subjective undertaking and, hence, only dependent upon the subject for its realization, 
which is what secures that it becomes absolute, as the subject's commitment to it is 
absolute. 
 
This need to free oneself from reason has itself a specific reason. Namely, the fact that 
in accordance with reason, nothing can become absolute for an existent being. To 
quote Kierkegaard: "...objektivt er der ingen Sandhed for existerende Væsener, men 
kun Approximation..."
34
 A state of affairs that makes it possible to view our limited 
power of reasoning as the thing that actually separate us from an Absolute. I.e. we are 
not able to comprehend an Absolute because we are finite, and have finite powers of 
cognition. But followingly, because we are hindered in reaching an Absolute by virtue 
of our limited reason, there becomes a possibility that we can reach it, if we find a 
way to transcend our reason, and believe against it. For if reason cannot comprehend 
an infinite, cannot acknowledge anything as infinite - cannot, therefore, something 
become infinite for us if we understand this limitation and consciously believe in 
something that our reason cannot comprehend. For thereby this that we so believe in, 
gets at least a chance at being Absolute - which is more that we can say of any belief 
that we entertain by virtue of our understanding. We cannot know whether this truly is 
infinite, but we can know that we cannot know this, because we can know that we are 
not, nor can ever be, in a position to understand such a thing. The point is that it may 
appear as an infinite to us, because of the mere possibility that it truly is infinite. And 
therefore also be infinite for us, not because we understand it, but because we do not 
understand it, and we understand that we do not understand the infinite. 
 
Such an act of defiance against reason is done by making a manifestly absurd idea the 
object of one's belief - the Christian mythos (I believe that the arbitrariness of this 
choice of Christianity has been given enough attention already, and I refrain from any 
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further remarks). But even though we have made up our minds to believe against our 
own better judgement in this way, it still is the case that it is our own better judgement 
that we are going to attempt to believe against. And that is no easy task. For it is not 
as if we are going to act against our better judgement, in a normal sense of this 
phrase. Something that would typically involve that we allow ourselves some 
immediate pleasure, that we succumb to the inclinations and desires that we have at a 
specific moment, even though we know that these do not accord with what we know 
to be the best the course of action. To act against one's better judgement is, in a 
typical case, to make a conscious deviation from the standard, or ideal, that one holds 
oneself to. For example, one lights up one last cigarette, even though one is aware that 
one quit the day before yesterday, or, one allows oneself just one more piece of cake, 
even though one already has had one's fair share. To believe against one's best 
judgement on the other hand, in the manner that Kierkegaard speaks of, is the blatant 
antithesis of this. It is not to make a conscious deviation from the ideal one hold's 
oneself to - it is to erect a new ideal by which one wishes to judge oneself. So, it is not 
so much to do something one knows to be wrong, as it is to transcend one's common 
understanding of wrong and right, rational and irrational in favour of an absolute and 
consciously irrational commitment to God and his standards
35
. And, to repeat, this 
commitment is not, and can never be, a commitment to something verified. Hence, it 
cannot become rational. And therefore it becomes the case that the state of belief that 
one creates in this manner is not a positive state - a state that is what it is in virtue of 
some positive fact that it mirrors. It is instead an essentially reactionary state, it is a 
willed negation of doubt - a parasitical state created as a pure counter-reaction to a 
state of doubt and despair. Which means that if it is interpreted at a rational, 
communal and intersubjective level, it does not make sense. The ideal that the subject 
chooses for himself in this manner becomes instead a wholly private ideal, not 
something he deems to be universally valid, but something that is an Absolute only 
for him. Hence it is not rationally absolute, but subjectively absolute. And therefore, 
to oppose it on rational grounds is meaningless, at least to the eyes that belong to this 
state. For it is precisely chosen with a view to rationality's limitations, and in order to 
step beyond them. 
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In the above description of the scenario we are investigating, "the leap of faith" would 
denote the act of consciously transcending, or negating, the state of doubt and despair. 
Which is state one reaches by means of what I have called the first step of faith. And 
where one is locked in a state of despair by simultaneously recognizing one's 
existential need for an Absolute, and one's epistemical inability to relate to such an 
Absolute. Furthermore, it is the consciousness of this manifest contradiction that is a 
part of one's being that allows one to perform the leap, and attain an absolute belief. 
And this state is needed for the leap because without the objective impossibility of an 
Absolute - I mean without the fact the one has finite epistemic capabilities, and are 
unable to rationally see some belief as absolute, one would not have the opportunity 
to reach it negatively. One would namely not be in a position to believe against one's 
reason - meaning, to consciously believe in something that one's reason rejects, 
precisely because it rejects it. To make this rejection into the very fact that guides one 
towards what one believes, because one knows that one's reason is unable to 
recognize something as Absolute, and one needs an Absolute. Therefore one 
consciously believes in this something that one's reason is unable to recognize as true. 
 
As a small digression, I would like to take the opportunity to say that in addition to 
his psychological insights, the genius of Kierkegaard lies, in effect, hidden beneath 
the main idea of the paragraph above. That he finds and elucidates a way in which one 
can relate to an Absolute, when the very thought of an Absolute has been rationally 
ridiculed. When God, or the thought of a greater whole, has been rejected as 
speculative in the name of science, and the notion of "thinking rationally" has been 
equated with analysing every process into its smallest constituents and mirroring the 
manner in which these co-operate in order to produce the process in question,
36
  
Kierkegaard finds a manner in which man can re-connect to the Absolute. That is, 
with something that stands above man, a higher meaning, and not below him as the 
natural processes must be said to do - as they are something he can manipulate and 
control, while God and the Absolute is something that he must bow down to. And 
even though it might seem contradictory, it is in this sense that the theist 
Kierkegaard's thought can be seen to be related to that of the atheist Nietzsche. For 
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both these thinkers’ attempts to re-introduce the thought of a higher meaning in the 
life of man. They both recognize, albeit for different motives and reasons, that the 
common man of their time has lost belief in a governing value and in something 
Absolute. In something, to put it bluntly, besides his own self-preservation that has 
self-evident worth. Science has made the common man nihilistic. The new bourgeois 
way of life has made him superficial and estranged. And in the society of their day 
(and this may be said to be even more true of our day) the common man himself has 
become the centre of his own life - in a social sense. He has always been this in an 
existential sense – that is trivial. But now man does not longer belong as he used to 
do, to a family, a clan, a farm, or a religion. He is, typically, not entwined in a social 
formation that dominates every part of his life. Instead, he is forced to be a kind of 
chameleon that tiptoes between numerous different roles and different standards of 
behaviour. And followingly, he does not inherently see himself as a part of a greater 
whole. For there is no such greater whole.
37
 At least not in a social sense, seeing as 
the social world he experiences is fragmented and compartmentalized. By virtue of 
this, man finds that the meaning of his existence is now contained within his 
particular social boundaries - that unique sphere that is the crystallization of the sum 
of his positions in the numerous social networks that he partakes in: His work, his 
leisure time activities, his family, and on and so forth. Through this he becomes for 
himself the measure of all things - for he is invariably the sole centre of his world. 
And ultimately, the meaning of his existence thus simmers down his subjective 
reaction to it, to his degree of contentment. 
 
But, according to Kierkegaard, without an Absolute he cannot truly be content. He 
can believe himself to be, of course. But that does not mean that he is.
38
 One is always 
in a state of despair and malcontent if one is not in possession of an infinite ideal by 
which one is able to relate to oneself - unless, therefore, one has faith.  
 
To leave this digression and return to where I left of, I there described the leap as a 
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movement of negation, in which one negates, or transcends, a state of absolute doubt, 
and reaches its antithesis, a state of absolute certainty. Now, for those of us whom 
have read Hegel, this pattern cannot fail to appear familiar. And in order to proceed 
with the explanation of the nature of the leap, and to bring out its underlying 
rationale, I want to present it in relation to Hegel's theory of the negative. In the 
following I will therefore give a cursory explanation of Hegel and his philosophy in 
regard to this concept. By no means an exhaustive and definitive explanation, but 
enough so that we gain a rudimentary understanding of the matter, and become able to 
appreciate the main point at hand. 
 
The core of the Hegelian philosophy is the dialectics. And at the core of the dialectics 
lies the idea that natural development is always done in the form of a negation. 
Change is always to Hegel, we can say, revolutionary. It is the overturning of one 
state into its natural opposite, both of which are contained within the being in question 
which undergoes the change. Mind you, Hegel speaks of this in an utterly general and 
metaphysical sense. So to him, every single change exemplifies this pattern. Which 
means, as a consequence, that each and every being must contain, potentially, the 
polar opposite of its current state of being (that is, if it has not played out every 
possibility inherent in it). As he states at one point in what has become known as his 
"shorter Logic": "...everything actual contains opposed determinations within it, and 
in consequence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension of an ob-ject 
amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed 
determinations."
39
 And what happens in the process of change is that the currently 
dominant feature of a being, the actual state of it, is overturned and sublated by this 
feature's antithesis, which rebels and rises to the state of dominance. This process is 
the process of negation, and negation is the actual movement in-between these two 
states - the leap from one actuality and into a new. As Hegel also calls it, the 
dialectical moment. 
 
Let me quote a piece from Hegel in order to explain this at greater length: "It is of the 
highest importance to interpret the dialectical [moment] properly, and to [re]cognise 
it. It is in general the principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the 
                                                           
39
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 
  50 
actual world. Equally, the dialectical is also the soul of all genuinely scientific 
cognition. In our ordinary consciousness, not stopping at the abstract determinations 
of the understanding appears as simple fairness, in accordance with the proverb 'live 
and let live', so that one thing holds and the other does also. But a closer look shows 
that the finite is not restricted merely from the outside; rather, it sublates itself by 
virtue of its own nature, and passes over, of itself, into its opposite. Thus we say, for 
instance, that man is mortal, and we regard dying as having its ground only in external 
circumstances. In this way of looking at things, a man has two specific properties, 
namely, that he is alive and also mortal. But the proper interpretation is that life as 
such bears the germ of death within itself, and that the finite sublates itself because it 
contradicts itself inwardly."
40
 
 
Now, the leap must be understood, in my view, as a form of rebellion against one's 
own finite nature on behalf of the infinite in us. As we will remember, the leap is 
done, as I have explained it, at bottom to acquire a complement to our own infinity, so 
that we become able to relate to ourselves by means of an ideal that does not involve 
finite and transitory categories, and thereby escape despair. 
 
This computes into the state of affairs that not only is the leap of faith related to the 
concept of negation in the sense that it is a transcendence of a given state for the 
benefit of its antithetical state, it also is a response to a given contradiction that exists 
within a being. What I have called the paradox of existence. 
 
The only difference that exists, as I see it, and which is a major difference, is that the 
leap of faith is a free choice, and not a necessary development according to the nature 
of the being in question. The leap of faith is not, as Hegel depicts death to be in the 
passage quoted above, something that lies germinating in the interior of a being and 
that slowly rises to the surface as a natural development. It is a willed occurrence, in 
the sense that it is not something that had to develop in a man over the course of time 
and in accordance to strict laws of development, it is something that the man in 
question made happen. 
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Before we go further with this, I would like to remark that this difference between 
Hegelian negation and the Kierkegaardian leap actually coincides with one of 
Kierkegaard's main objections to the Hegelian system: The objection that it is 
impossible to make change into a logical category. Followingly that the Hegelian 
system is at its very core constructed about a fundamental misunderstanding, and is, 
in reality, nothing but a phantom of the imagination. For as we have seen, the dialectic 
that is the heart of Hegel's thought utilizes the negative as its main ingredient, and it is 
impossible to make this dialectic work without it - the very notion of such an attempt 
is, in fact, manifestly nonsensical. 
 
The problem with the negative, as Kierkegaard sees it, is that it belongs to a different 
sphere than that of thought. For what Hegel attempts to do with his logical system is 
to describe the nature of existence and the world in a Platonic sense. To see it 
objectively and sub specie aeternitatis. Now, what remarks Hegel in his attempt to 
describe the world in this metaphysical sense, is that he acknowledges that to do this, 
one has to make the negative, or change, into a factor of the system itself. This is his 
way of going beyond a strictly Platonic metaphysics, in which essences are eternal 
and atemporal, by making essences themselves into something dynamic and evolving. 
To Hegel an essence is a composition of opposed forces that develop along a 
trajectory that is decided through the struggle of these forces that makes it up. 
 
What he does not see, according to Kierkegaard, is that though this is correct, in the 
sense that the negative, or change, is the essential characteristic of existence, it is 
impossible to represent this in thought. Because if you attempt to see the world sub 
specie aeternitatis - from the point of view of eternity, that is, outside of time - then 
change is inconceivable. As Kierkegaard himself says: "At tænke Existents sub specie 
æterni og i Abstraktion, er væsentligen at ophæve den, og Fortjenesten ligesom den 
udbasunede med at hæve Modsigelsens Grundsætning. Existents lader sig ikke tænke 
uden Bevægelse, og Bevægelse lader sig ikke tænke sub specie æterni. At udelade 
Bevægelsen er just ikke noget Mesterstykke, og at faae den ind i Logiken som 
Overgang, og med den Tid og Rum, er kun ny Forvirring."
41
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And it is only confusion, because as Kierkegaard goes on to say: "Forsaavidt al 
Tænken imidlertid er evig, er Vanskeligheden for den Existerende. Existents er 
ligesom Bevægelse en saare vanskelig Sag at omgaaes. Tænker jeg den, saa hæver jeg 
den, og saa tænker jeg den ikke."
42
 
  
What I believe Kierkegaard is aiming at, is that thought has the property that anything 
captured by it is infinitized. (And I will explain what I mean by that.) For example, 
say you are thinking of a tree, the tree right in front of you as you have halted your 
stroll through the park, if so, then you are not, actually, thinking of that tree. The tree 
right in front of you. You are entertaining a thought of a tree of the kind that are in 
front of you, so much is true, but nothing separates this thought that you are 
entertaining at this exact instance, from a thought entertained at another instance, in 
front of another tree, but one of the same type as the first one. For thought, according 
to Kierkegaard, deals exclusively in types: "Men at existere betyder først og fremmest 
at være en Enkelt, og derfor er det, at Tænkningen maa see bort fra Existents, fordi 
det Enkelte ikke lader sig tænke, men kun det Almene."43 And it is in this sense that 
thought is infinite. In the sense that it does not involve finite and particular objects 
with a limited and unstable existence, but only types. And types are infinite in the 
sense that they themselves never undergo change. They are eternal in the sense that 
they are not a part of existence, and existence is what is temporal. For whereas every 
particular object will wither and change and decay, for every particular object is 
finite, a thought will always be the thought that is. It does not, in itself, contain an 
impetus to change. 
 
This has to do with the fact that thought, as Kierkegaard conceives of it, is a medium 
of pure possibility. And what is meant by that, is that thought, in its nature as 
something inherently general, is a natural contrast to the real, which is precisely a 
medium of actuality. (The adverse of possibility.) For though thought represents the 
real, and thereby relates to it, it represents it as something the real is not. It represents 
it in the form of a type, of a composite concept made up of the general features of the 
object in question. As Kierkegaard states it in Sygdommen til Døden: "...man kan ikke 
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tænke et enkelt Menneske, men kun Begrebet Menneske."
44
 This makes thought in a 
very important sense independent of the real. For thought never involves itself with 
what makes up the real as such - particular objects. It cannot, as we have seen, think a 
particular, but must always render the particular as a type. In this sense, thought is 
always, in a manner of speaking, a false rendition of the real. Thought is in it is nature 
a fictitious, or imaginary medium. Something forever unreal. For it does not merely 
copy the real as it is, our thought does not revolve around separate and isolated 
impressions that stand unrelated to each other before our mind's eye, it infinitizes the 
real, and makes it into types. And a type never refers solely to one particular 
representative of its nature. It refers to all, and therefore to none in particular. And can 
followingly be said to be an eternal possibility, because it relates to the real as 
possibility relates to the actual. As something that is, but is not the realized case. 
 
Kierkegaard formulates this as follows: "Abstraktionen afhandler Mulighed og 
Virkelighed, men dens Opfattelse af Virkeligheden er en falsk Gjengivelse, da Mediet 
ikke er Virkeligheden men Muligheden. Kun ved at ophæve Virkeligheden kan 
Abstraktionen faae fat paa den, men at ophæve den, er netop at forvandle den til 
Mulighed. Alt, hvad der i Abstraktionens Sprog indenfor Abstraktionen siges om 
Virkelighed, siges indenfor Muligheden."
45
 
 
These reflections bear directly on the issue of change that we began with in the 
following manner: Change is inherently a discontinuity. It is a process by which an 
object becomes different from what it was while still, in a sense, remaining the same. 
A process, through which, a possibility that lies immanent within the object in 
question is definitely realized, or actualized. It is hence an exclusion of a current 
actuality (together with a number of other different possibilities) on behalf of one 
chosen possibility. And in this sense it is something antithetical to thought. For in 
thought, nothing is definitely realized, but everything is conceived of according to its 
general nature. In other words, in view of all the inherent capabilities and possibilities 
that the object in question has. While it is exactly through the process of change that a 
particular object differentiates itself from its ideal type, and becomes an object with a 
specific set of properties. For it is through its specificity, through the fact that it has 
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developed a limited set of the possibilities inherent in it, that it diverges from the ideal 
type. Its singularity and particularity consists in - for thought - a limitation of its 
general nature and potential. 
 
Hence it is in this sense that change, the negative, which is something that belongs to 
existence, is impossible to think. For it is a process antithetical to the medium of 
thought, in which nothing is definitely realized to the exclusion of something else, but 
which is precisely the world viewed sub specie aeternitatis, outside of change. 
 
To return to there we left of, the manner in which the leap of faith exemplifies 
Kierkegaard's critique of the Hegelian negation, is that in it we can clearly see the 
principle of negation, but it is now used in a manner that contrasts with Hegel's. 
Kierkegaard does not seek to describe reality through his concept of the leap. The leap 
is instead exactly the point at which his own theory comes to an end, for whereas 
Hegel's theory is built upon, and begins with, the notion of negation, Kierkegaard's 
thought can be said to, not begin with it, but lead up to the negation. His project is to 
make people perform the leap, as it is through the leap that one wins faith. The leap is, 
therefore, nothing that takes place in his theory, as negation takes place in Hegel's. 
The leap can only be realized in a particular individual. 
 
At the outset of this section I voiced the thought that since we can know that it is 
impossible for us to enter into a conventional epistemic relation to the Absolute, to 
God, this knowledge itself actually opens up of us a manner in which we can come to 
relate to the Absolute - paradoxical as that may seem. The manner in which this may 
come about is that this knowledge allows us to identify the Absolute with that which 
we are not, with that which is other than ourselves and is not of us. The reasoning 
here can be understood along the following lines: We cannot directly relate to the 
Absolute because the Absolute is infinite, and we are finite - or, at least, not wholly 
infinite, but a middle term in-between the wholly infinite and its counterpart. We are a 
synthesis of the infinite and finite. But as such a synthesis, it is our finiteness that 
causes us to not be of the nature of the infinite. So, in regard to the infinite, we are 
finite. As such, we are categorically separated from the Absolute. We are different 
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from it. But that correspondingly means that the Absolute is different form us - it is 
that which we are not. It is our negation. 
 
This puts us in the position of being able to relate to the Absolute, not as a positive 
given entity, but as a contrast to ourselves which we do know. We cannot know what 
the Absolute is exactly, that much is given, but we can know what it is not. So by 
acting against ourselves, by leaving what defines us as whom we are behind, and 
stepping out beyond ourselves, we can throw ourselves into a relation with the 
Absolute. We know, namely, that the Absolute is that which us beyond us, and so we 
make this step out beyond ourselves in order to reach it. And in this context, where 
what is at stake is a belief, a state of conviction, what we do in order to make this step 
beyond ourselves, is to believe against ourselves. We make the criteria of being 
rationally unbelievable into the criteria of what we are to believe in. Hence, what fuels 
faith is that it is absurd: "... thi det Absurde er netop Troens Gjenstand og det Eneste, 
der lader sig troe."
46
 
 
And as Kierkegaard says later on: "Saasnart Uvisheden ikke er Vishedens Form, 
saasnart Uvisheden ikke bestandigt holder den Religieuse svævende, for bestandigt at 
gribe Visheden, saasnart Visheden ligesom plomberer den Religieuse, ja saa er han 
naturligviis ifærd med at blive Masse."
47
 
 
Hence, to have faith is to have a belief that one is not entitled to have, in a rational 
sense. It is to believe in something more than one is capable of believing in, to be 
afloat, as Kierkegaard phrases it, beyond the certain and the rational. 
 
What is taking place here, through this step, this leap into faith, may be difficult to 
comprehend. I certainly find it difficult to put clearly into words, but, in essence, the 
movement from the state of doubt and to the state of absolute belief - to faith - is not 
done, as I have frequently emphasized, through a rational progression, through the 
understanding of some fact or reason, but by a negation of this doubt - by a stepping 
beyond of the elements that makes the doubt actual. And this negation of the doubt 
and of the elements that fuel it is, in a sense, also a negation of oneself, and one's own 
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nature. It is the act of embracing what cannot be known by us as we are, precisely 
because it cannot be known by us. The subject in making this step does not act upon 
an understanding of the Absolute he seeks to embrace, but acts upon an understanding 
of what it is not. The Absolute is the negation of himself. Hence the subject goes 
against himself in order to acquire it. For by negating itself, the subject reaches the 
negation of itself, which is the Absolute. 
 
In this stepping beyond, we see perfectly exemplified the main thrust of the Hegelian 
principle of negation. A principle that holds that a new state of being is got at through 
a contradiction of the current state. Not through a simple causal relation. The new 
state is not the effect of a cause that in some sense contains the effect in question as a 
possible outcome. Something that can, for example be said of a simple mechanical 
reaction, wherein the movement that is caused is contained within the movement that 
causes it. The movement of one billiard ball moves another billiard ball. Movement 
causes movement - the effect is contained within the cause. In contradistinction to 
this, Hegel holds that change takes place through a dialectical relation. Through a 
revolutionary reaction, where the effect is precisely not contained within the cause, 
but where the effect is the negation and contradiction of the prior the state. And faith 
is precisely such a revolution, as it is defined for the subject that acquires it, not as a 
positive state in itself - as a response to a reason - but as the contrast to the skeptical 
doubt that is his by force of his nature. The leap of faith is the overturning of the 
doubt, and it gets it meaning and becomes what it is by being precisely this. It has not 
positive meaning as such. It is the antithetical and complementary other of this doubt. 
And it is got at by the free choice of the subject, as the subject chooses to believe 
against himself, chooses to transcend the doubt and reach God negatively. 
 
Herein lies the fact that faith is a continual process, and not something that is acquired 
definitely once it is acquired. For faith cannot exist other than as the negative of the 
state of doubt that is a human being's natural condition, or rather is the definite 
expression as regards knowledge, of a human being's finite nature. Faith is, 
followingly, not stable in itself, but requires the contrast of doubt to always be what it 
is. Hence, to have faith, is to live in an eternal repetition, an eternal struggle between 
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doubt and conviction. It is, so to speak, to live in the leap without ever landing. 
 
 
2.8 - Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have tried to formulate an understanding, in the form of a two-step 
process, of how one is to acquire an absolute belief in God in Kierkegaard's sense. My 
idea has been that this state of belief is achieved, not through a rational development, 
but through a negative and irrational leap, or dialectical moment, as Hegel would have 
called it. A negative leap wherein the extreme of one position (absolute doubt) 
overturns into its natural opposite (absolute conviction) through the free choice of the 
individual itself. 
 
The reason that this belief becomes absolute is to my mind two-fold: Firstly, it is 
because the state of belief in question is consciously and intentionally irrational. 
Hence, it is immune to further rational correction, not because it is rationally 
indisputable, but because it is simply indisputable - it has no rational ground that 
validates it, and therefore there exists no basis upon which one can rationally 
approach it. Nor, and connected with this, is it a belief than one should feel the need 
to intersubjectively defend and argue for. By being what it is, it is an essentially 
subjective belief. And one must bear it all by oneself. 
 
Secondly, it is absolute because what keeps the individual committed to the belief is 
his, or her, wish to escape despair - despair being a constant (and thereby infinite) 
concern for the individual, as it is a natural consequence of the nature of the 
individual's being, and something the individual is unable to escape by any other 
route. 
 
As to how faith enables one to escape despair, that is the topic of the next chapter. 
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3 - The second level of faith; faith as emotional autonomy 
 
 
3.1 - Introduction 
 
One of the definitions of faith that I gave in Section 2.1 was that faith was the 
opposite, or negation, of despair. This feature of faith was also, moreover, what I 
presented as the prime motivating factor as to why someone should wish to acquire an 
absolute belief in God (see Section 2.5). But still, on the basis of the whole Chapter 2, 
one does not learn just as to how faith is the state of not being in despair, as to how a 
belief in God succeeds in relieving one from this emotional agony. This I wish to treat 
in this chapter. 
 
What I did say about the matter in Chapter 2 was that faith supplied one with an 
infinite ideal by which one could relate to oneself, so as to avoid relating to oneself 
through finite and unstable ideals. For despair is viewed throughout this essay as the 
state of not being what one wants to be, i.e. of not conforming to the ideal that one has 
for oneself (see especially Section 2.5).
48
 What I seek to do here, is to deepen just 
what is meant by this. For contrary to what may be the obvious interpretation, it is not 
the case that one automatically gains God and the Christian ethics as the ideal that one 
holds for oneself by gaining faith. The reason for this is that what I speak of as an 
individual's ideal, though related to the sphere of ethics proper, first and foremost 
concerns one's own relation to oneself and who one is - in the sense that one's ideal is 
the identity that one feels that one ought to have. One's ideal is an expression of the 
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person that one feels one ought to be. Now, it easy to see how this does relate to 
ethics, that is, how it relates to our relationships with other people, as who one wants 
to be, and followingly appear as, invariably influence how one behaves towards 
others. But it is not in this sense that we are interested in it here. Here we are 
interested in one's ideal in the sense of one's own relation to it and to oneself. In a 
private, personal and interior sense, that is. 
 
A person's ideal, as defined above, is inseparably connected with a person's identity. 
One cannot, for example, remove the ideal of being a brilliant author from the mind of 
William Faulkner, had this been possible, and then imagine that one would be 
confronted by the very same individual as before this operation. The ideal of being a 
brilliant author is constitutive, we must imagine to ourselves, of what it is like to be 
William Faulkner - as he was a quite ambitious and self-conscious author. And it is 
not just in the sense that without this ideal, Faulkner would not have become the man 
he became. It is, more importantly, in the sense that without this ideal Faulkner would 
not be the man that he actually was at any point of his career. What is at stake here is 
not the fact that who a person becomes is a function of who he wants to become, 
together with the pressures and opportunities inherent in the social field that he 
belongs to. What is at stake is the fact that who a person wants to be is an actual part 
of who a person is here and now. It is one of the basic truths of every normal person's 
psychological structure that he inherently relates to whom he is, and what he wants to 
be. So that who we are, generally speaking, is partly made up by our relation to whom 
we are and who we want to be. To see this point in relation to Kierkegaard, compare 
the definition of a human being that is given in Section 2.2, where it is defined as a 
relation between the finite and the infinite that inherently relates to what itself is. 
 
Now, Christianity does not wish, nor attempt, through faith, to change our identity 
and personality. That it is not its aim. What it wishes to do is save us from despair. 
That is, save us from the possibility of not conforming to our own ideal for ourselves. 
And how it does this is what we will look into in the following. 
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3.2 - Kierkegaard's defence of the parable of Abraham and Isaac 
 
The passage that is going to be the main element in my argument is located near the 
very beginning of Frygt og Bæven, where it forms a part of the section entitled 
"Foreløbig Expectoration". Now, this section is meant as a general introduction to the 
topics and thoughts that Kierkegaard intends to treat in the book as a whole, but in 
addition to this it also contains some of Kierkegaard's most lucid treatments of the 
nature of what he sees as the religious state. And, in contrast to what we have already 
seen of this state, it is not as to how one attains the state that he is interested here, but 
as to what psychological consequences the attainment of the state has for the 
individual in question. For the religious state does not end with one's absolute belief 
in God. No, when this matter is settled and one has performed the first motion, there 
comes a second phase, and one has to perform an additional motion. (These two 
motions each comprising one level of the two levels of faith that I spoke in the 
introduction [see Section 1.1].) Kierkegaard himself, of course, never treats this 
explicitly, and he never, to my knowledge, speaks of two motions of faith in this 
sense, nor of "a second phase". This is my way of interpreting the nature of the 
religious state. But it is not spurious and an expression of something wholly 
subjective on my part. I regard this interpretation as a natural consequence of 
attempting to understand Kierkegaard's ideal state. For Kierkegaard does always 
emphasize that the religious man gains a peculiar kind of boon by force of his 
conviction. As he formulates it in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift: "Altsaa dette 
er det evig Visse, at hvad der behager Gud lykkes den Fromme. Men nu det Næste; 
hvad er det, der behager Gud? Er det Dette eller Hiint, er det denne Livsstilling han 
skal vælge, denne Pige han skal ægte, dette Arbeide han skal begynde, dette 
Foretagende han skal opgive? Ja maaskee, og maaskee ikke. Er dette ikke ironisk 
nok? Og dog er det evigt vist, og der er Intet saa vist, som dette, at hvad der behager 
Gud det lykkes den Fromme. Ja, men derfor skal den Religieuse ikke saa meget 
bekymre sig om det Udvortes, men eftertragte de høieste Goder, Sjelens Fred, sin 
Sjels Frelse: dette behager altid Gud. Og det er vist, o saa vist som at Gud lever, at 
hvad der behager Gud, det lykkes den Fromme."
49
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Peace of mind - that is the boon that the religious man gains. Or, as we have spoken of 
it earlier on, he becomes immune to despair. But, as I have mentioned, it is not clear, 
certainly not on account of the discussion contained in Chapter 2, just as to how faith 
makes one immune to despair. And this process, I postulate, the process of becoming 
immune, necessitates an additional and new motion that the individual has to perform. 
(By the old motion, I mean to denote the process of actually gaining faith - the leap.) 
The reason that I postulate this, has to do with how Kierkegaard describes the man of 
faith in the relevant passages of Frygt og Bæven. For there he describes the truly 
religious man - the Knight of Faith, as he names him - as a man capable of going 
through a peculiar sort of movement, or motion. A motion that enables him, on the 
one hand, to resign from the world and to empty it of emotional significance, and on 
the other, to win it back. But not through a renewed faith in it as it is, and an 
accompanying novel emotional attachment to it. No, he wins back his relation to the 
world through his relation to God. For the Knight of Faith, God becomes a mediating 
factor in-between himself and world, so that even if the world grossly mistreats him, 
he has confidence that it will turn out for the best - in the end. In short, this is actually 
how one escapes despair. Through faith in God, one does not regard what happens in 
the world as having direct significance for one, because one knows, that it in the end, 
God will set it aright. And because of this, one will never truly fail one's ideal, as 
whatever happens, it will all end in a satisfactory manner when the last note has been 
sung. 
 
This is, I confess, a rather crude way of formulating the matter, and in what follows I 
will expound upon it, and show how Kierkegaard thinks that it is possible to attain 
this kind emotional autonomy vis-à-vis one's surroundings in more technical terms. 
But before we begin with this, let us first situate our coming discussion in relation to 
the contents of the book as a whole. 
 
The book, Frygt og Bæven, is in essence a discussion of how one is to interpret the 
parable of Abraham and Isaac. Where the emphasize is placed upon the ethical 
dilemmas that attach to the figure of Abraham, and to the parable as such in which 
this figure resides. For in the parable, Abraham is given a trial of faith, though he does 
not himself know that what he undergoes is merely a trial - a test of his devotion. As 
he experiences it, he is simply one day commanded by God to sacrifice his only son 
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Isaac. That is, he is commanded to perform, what in ethical terms is, a murder. In 
response to this command, Abraham sets out from his home accompanied by his son, 
and fully intending to actually kill Isaac on God's behalf. He has no awareness of the 
fact that God does not intend to let him go through with it. He is set on performing as 
God wishes. Now, as it happens, God does not wish for Abraham til fulfil the 
command. And he stops Abraham from seeing it through, so that Abraham does not 
kill Isaac. Instead, the story ends with Abraham and Isaac offering a ram to God that 
God himself brings forth before them, in order to praise God's benevolence. 
 
The problem with this tale (of which you were now only presented with the essential 
details) is that, though Abraham is stopped by God before he actually performs the 
misdeed of murdering Isaac, Abraham was fully willing to perform it, and would have 
performed it, or so the story indicates, if God had not intervened. As a consequence, 
Abraham potentially killed in the name of God, and fully intended to kill. Which is a 
highly problematical feature in someone that is presented, in Kierkegaard's words, as 
the father of faith
50
 - as the epitome of all that Christianity stands for. Seeing as to 
fully intend to murder someone is a decidedly immoral act. And it is therefore 
questionable if someone willing to murder another person, let alone his own son, is 
worthy of reverence. For he is certainly not worthy of reverence in a moral sense. 
 
Moreover, because of the dubious nature of its content, the parable itself becomes a 
problem. For what does it mean to preach Abraham's willingness to perform this 
misdeed? And what is it meant to convey to hold this willingness up as an ideal from 
which one should learn? Learn what? That to murder in the name of God is 
acceptable? That one should be willing to do anything, absolutely anything, for one's 
faith, even what one knows in an ethical sense one ought not to do? This furthermore, 
as anyone can see, does not relate well to the rest of the Christian doctrine. Especially 
to its emphasis on compassion, brotherly love and the innate worth of every human 
being, even of the ones that it categorizes as "sinners", and in this context, the parable 
becomes a problem. It is safe to say that its role in Christian dogmatics has been much 
disputed over the years. 
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Kierkegaard's intention is to defend this parable. And in order to defend it he has to 
prove to us that there exits a sense in which Abraham's behaviour is not something 
abhorrent. What is more, in order for it to be an ideal for us - for Abraham to be a sort 
of religious hero and paragon, which is precisely what Kierkegaard intends for him to 
be, as he speaks of him as a Knight of Faith, or as the Knight of faith
51
 (a knight being 
the quintessential romantic hero) - Kierkegaard has to prove to us that there exists a 
sense in which his behaviour actually is commendable. 
 
This intention reveals itself especially well at the end of the introductory part of the 
book where Kierkegaard writes as follows: "Det er da nu min Agt af Fortællingen om 
Abraham i Form af Problemata at uddrage det Dialektiske, der ligger i den, for at see, 
hvilket uhyre Paradox Troen er, et Paradox, der formaaer at gjøre et Mord til en hellig 
og gudvelbehagelig Handling..."
52
 
 
The way in which he goes about this project, is to argue that there takes a place a 
teleological suspension of the ethical in view to the story of Abraham. Which is to say 
that what rescues Abraham to Kierkegaard's mind, is that Abraham does not perform 
an act that belongs to the ethical sphere at all. This in the sense that it is neither 
ethical, nor unethical - it is beyond the bounds of the ethical. So that the validity of 
the ethical is suspended with regard to it. At the same time, it is not an aesthetical act 
either, in Kierkegaard's strict sense of this term (see below). That is, it is not 
performed for the sake of some calculated gain in order to satisfy a subjective desire. 
Nor could it have been, if it were to escape the ethical. For aesthetical sphere does not 
lie beyond the ethical sphere - it lies below it, according to Kierkegaard. It is that 
which the ethical negates in order to be what it is. 
 
What I am referring to now in speaking of the ethical and the aesthetical as rigidly 
defined "spheres", is what is known as Kierkegaard's theory of "the stages". Which I 
here will give a cursory explanation of, as an elementary acquaintance with this 
theory is needed for the overall understanding of Frygt og Bæven that I am 
formulating later on. The stages are, essentially, examples different forms of 
Weltanschauung - world-views. And there are, roughly speaking, three main spheres 
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according to Kierkegaard that one can live in and be a part of: The aesthetical, the 
ethical and the religious. In saying that, it should at the same time be noted that there 
are not many people in the world that actually belong solely and deliberately to only 
one of the spheres in question. Most of us, are not nearly self-conscious enough to 
pull this of, nor is the single-minded determination needed a very common attribute 
among men. Instead, the multitude belong latently and half-heartedly a little to the 
one, and a little to other, and really, in a strict sense, to none of them (the one and the 
other being the ethical and the aesthetical - as the third sphere, the religious, does not 
allow entry for dabblers and half-hearts). The reason that I say that they do not, in a 
strict sense, belong to any of them, even though there is a sense in which they are 
connected to them, is that a prerequisite for clearly belonging to a sphere is that one 
consciously relates to oneself as a participant in that sphere in question, one has to 
have made a conscious commitment to it, and as I said above, such a conscious 
relationship to one's own existence is lacking in the common multitude, therefore they 
fail to qualify by default. Instead it can be said to be the case that the forces the 
spheres represent work latently and haphazardly in them, without they themselves 
attempting to bind up a strict continuity in their behaviour along any of the trajectories 
inherent in the given spheres. 
 
For what it means to belong to a sphere, can precisely be approached by this metaphor 
that it is to follow a certain defined trajectory through life. As what characterizes a 
sphere is that it represents a certain way in which an individual can find a meaning 
with his existence. Each sphere representing a driving force that potentially propels an 
individual in certain direction through his life if he commits to it. A sphere is 
therefore something that provides an individual with a goal and a standard by which 
he can relate to his own life, and give it direction. The aesthetic, for example, places 
an ultimate value on his own purely subjective condition, on his feelings, moods and 
desires, in the sense that he always acts in view to satisfy his earthly needs, and make 
the most out of his emotional states. (Though not in a vulgar fashion, as Kierkegaard's 
aesthetician is not animal-like in procuring for his needs, he is rather a connoisseur in 
the field, one that willingly puts himself through great hardships in order to 
experience an even sweeter prize.) In contradistinction the aesthetician, the ethicist on 
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the other hand, steers himself consciously not in regard to his desires, but always with 
a view to what is ethical. And the religious, in the contradistinction to both of the 
foregoing, behaves in accordance with his private and wholly subjective relation to 
the Absolute itself - God. 
 
In addition, it must be mentioned that the three spheres are ordered hierarchically, 
with the religious being at the top, and the aesthetic being at the bottom, the ethical 
forming a sort of middle in-between these. As to the reason behind this ordering, this 
will become apparent as we proceed with the general discussion in this section. At 
this point it just important to keep it in mind that such an ordering exists. Also, I have 
actually already mentioned, at the end of the paragraph that led up to this little 
excursion over Kierkegaard's theory of the stages, an important factor in the 
interrelation between the spheres, namely the fact that the ethical is what it is by being 
a negation the aesthetical, which means that it is what it is by being what the 
aesthetical is not - the ethical is a complementary contrast of the aesthetical. 
 
This can, for example, be gathered from the following quote: "For den ethiske 
Betragtning af Livet er det da den Enkeltes Opgave, at afføre sig selv Inderlighedens 
Bestemmelse og udtrykke denne i et Ydre. Hver Gang den Enkelte krymper sig derved, 
hver Gang han vil holde sig tilbage i eller smutte ned igjen i Inderlighedens 
Bestemmelse af Følelse, Stemning o.s.v., da forsynder han sig, da ligger han i 
Anfægtelse."
53
 
 
The term "the inner" is in this quote (as it also is in Kierkegaard's thought generally 
speaking) related to emotion, passion and mood. Which are all prototypical subjective 
elements - the elements that belong to the sphere of aesthetics proper. In opposition to 
this, the quote places "the outer", which is the ethical. Now, the rationale behind this 
dichotomy, and the manner in which it is formed, is that the ethical is, by 
Kierkegaard, defined as the inherently universal: "Det Ethiske er som saadant det 
Almene, og som det Almene Det, der er gjeldende for Enhver, hvilket fra en anden 
Side lader sig udtrykke saaledes, at det er gjeldende i ethvert Øyeblik."
54
 It is that 
which inherently has validity for every one of us despite subjective differences. 
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Despite, precisely, what is subjective in us. The ethical is, therefore, by virtue of its 
definition opposed to the aesthetical - it is the non-subjective, the objective, the 
universal. And to act ethically in an authentic sense becomes to act in a manner that is 
opposed to acting aesthetically. For in acting ethically, one has to act by virtue of 
what is universally valid, by virtue of what is one's duty, and therefore not by virtue 
of one's inclinations. And one's duty is, moreover, something that is of a contrasting 
nature than that of one's inclinations, as one's inclinations is something particular to 
oneself and hence subjective, duty (the ethically right thing to do), on the other hand, 
being universal. 
 
As you may notice, in view of Kierkegaard's definitions above, Kierkegaard's concept 
of the ethical in Frygt og Bæven is markedly Kantian. As also Kant, in his ethical 
theories, defines acting ethically as precisely not acting on behalf of one's subjective 
inclinations - but as acting out of an understanding of the Categorical Imperative 
(which is to say, of what is universally right).
55
 
 
So, in light of what has been said so far, it should become clear that in order for there 
to exist a suspension of the ethical, Abraham has to act in accordance with a sphere 
that lies beyond the ethical, as the ethical lies beyond the aesthetical. Which means 
that he has to act in a manner that is not informed and motivated by his subjective 
inclinations and desires, nor by what is his ethical duty. By what then, you ask? 
Kierkegaard's answer is his faith in God. And Kierkegaard's proposition by saying so 
is that the religious sphere is a sphere that lies beyond the ethical one, like the ethical 
lies beyond the aesthetical, so that an act done religiously would be suspended from 
an ethical judgement just as an ethical act would be suspended from an aesthetical 
judgement. (It should be quite clear that an act truly motivated by the ethical makes 
no sense from an aesthetical point of view, as it makes no reference to subjective 
inclinations, but only to universal duty. Hence it is suspended from aesthetical 
judgement. Which means that seen from the point of view of the aesthetical it is pure 
absurdity. For the aesthetical will never be in a position to understand it.) 
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As Kierkegaard states in this relation: "Troen er nemlig dette Paradox, at den Enkelte 
er høiere end det Almene, dog vel at mærke saaledes, at Bevægelsen gjentager sig, at 
han altsaa, efterat have været i det Almene, nu som den enkelte isolerer sig som 
høiere end det Almene."
56
 (As I stated a little while back, Kierkegaard identifies the 
ethical with the universal, that is, "det Almene".) 
 
Later on in the text following the passage just quoted Kierkegaard expounds on the 
above: "Troens Paradox er da dette, at den Enkelte er høiere end det Almene, at den 
Enkelte, for at erindre om en nu sjeldnere dogmatisk Distinction, bestemmer sit 
Forhold til det Almene ved sit Forhold til det Absolute, ikke sit Forhold til det 
Absolute ved sit Forhold til det Almene. Paradoxet kan ogsaa udtrykkes saaledes, at 
der er en absolut Pligt mod Gud; thi i dette Pligtforhold forholder den Enkelte som 
den Enkelte sig absolut til det Absolute. Naar det da i denne Forbindelse hedder, at 
det er Pligt at elske Gud, saa siges dermed noget Andet end i det Foregaaende; thi er 
denne Pligt absolut, saa er det Ethiske nedsat til det Relative. Heraf følger dog ikke, at 
dette skal tilintetgjøres, men det faaer et ganske andet Udtryk, det paradoxe Udtryk, 
saaledes at f.Ex. Kjærlighed til Gud kan bringe Troens Ridder til at give sin 
Kjærlighed til Næsten det modsatte Udtryk af hvad der ethisk talt er Pligt."
57
 
 
The best manner in which to understand the idea that Kierkegaard is presenting here, 
to understand how the religious can succeed in being beyond the ethical, and thereby 
succeed in justifying acts contrary to what is ethically thought of as right and which, 
moreover, are seen to be more right, to actually outweigh the ethical in sense of 
importance, the best manner in which to understand this, is, I believe, to try to 
understand the full meaning of the particular part of the quote above that I have 
emphasised. Which means in a more general sense that we have to try to understand 
how the three mentioned spheres - the aesthetical, the ethical and the religious - each 
relate to the Absolute (and how the differ from one another in this regard).  
 
If you now re-read the part of the quote that is emphasised, you will see that in it 
Kierkegaard defines the difference between the ethicist and religious, by how the two 
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relate to the two concepts of the Absolute and the universal. The ethicist relates to the 
Absolute by virtue of his relationship with the universal. A fact that must be 
understood in the sense that it is through the universal that he gains an absolute. So 
that, to the ethicist, it is precisely the ethical that is the Absolute. As the ethical is the 
medium that conveys absoluteness to him by being the conduit through which he can 
come into contact with it. Followingly, the ethicist does not stand in a direct 
relationship to the Absolute, but in a mediated relationship. A relationship that is 
mediated through the universal (the ethical is, as you will remember, defined as the 
universal - as what is universally valid). Making this mediating level into what 
appears to the ethicist to be the Absolute. 
 
Were we to illustrate this idea metaphorically, we could use Platonic imagery, and say 
that an ethicist is like a man who has always been trapped inside a darkened room - a 
kind of Platonic cave. A room that has only one window, and in which this window is 
small, and perched high up on the wall, so that the man inside of the room is unable to 
look directly through it. Outside of the room there is light. Which, of course, filters 
through the window and into room. But to the man, whom has never been on the 
outside of this chamber, there is no light source beyond the window itself. He, we 
have to imagine, identifies the light with the medium that conveys it. And this 
situation is structurally identical to how the ethicist, I believe, identifies the universal 
with the Absolute. As it is the universal that places him in a relationship with the 
Absolute, and that he is, moreover, unable to otherwise interact with it, just as the 
man in the darkened room relates to the light as something that originates with the 
window, as he cannot know what lies beyond the walls that entrap him. None of them, 
not the ethicist, nor the man in the room, are able to place themselves in a direct 
relation with the source of their respective illumination, and they interact with this 
source through a mediate level, which for them takes on the aspect of being this 
source, as they are unable to separate the two from their given position. 
 
I am now leaving the metaphor of the room behind, so as to turn to the situation of the 
religious. For here the metaphor is no longer fully representative of what is taking 
place. Its isomorphism extends only to the situation of the ethicist. Now, as regards 
the religious, he can be said to invert the general scenario that the ethicist finds 
himself to be in as described by Kierkegaard in his quote. That is, he relates to the 
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universal by virtue of his relationship with the Absolute, and not the other way 
around. To him, followingly, the Absolute is not something inherently universal. It is 
something he interacts with directly as the subject that he is, unmediated by any third 
category. Which implies that the Absolute, for the religious one, is a subjective 
Absolute. In the sense that the religious Absolute is private and personal and has 
validity uniquely for the religious individual alone. It is, therefore, something that 
cannot be explained or defended, not even formulated into a communicable principle. 
It cannot even be represented in thought: "Troen er netop dette Paradox, at den 
Enkelte som den Enkelte er høiere end det Almene, er berettiget ligeoverfor dette, 
ikke subordineret, men overordnet, dog vel at mærke saaledes, at det er den Enkelte, 
der efter at have været som den Enkelte det Almene underordnet, nu gjennem det 
Almene bliver den Enkelte, der som den Enkelte staaer i et absolut Forhold til det 
Absolute. Dette Standpunkt lader sig ikke mediere; thi al Mediation skeer netop i 
Kraft af det Almene; det er og bliver i al Evighed et Paradox, utilgængeligt for 
Tænkningen."
58
 
 
To be religious, then, is to stand isolated in a direct relationship to the Absolute. 
Hence it is to stand in a subjective relationship to the Absolute, since the entity that 
possess the direct relationship in question precisely is a subject. And what a subject 
relates to directly, or, we can say, immediately, it, followingly, relates to subjectively. 
To be religious is therefore to have a privileged and private access to the Absolute, in 
the same sense as we all have a privileged and private access to our own thoughts and 
emotional states. And analogously, just as we cannot speak our emotions, that is, 
cannot materialize our actual, particular emotions in speech and share them directly 
with somebody else, but only speak about them, represent them mediated by a third 
category, language - and the difference here, though obvious, is crucial - we cannot 
express the religiously Absolute. For what is subjective cannot become universal 
without loosing precisely its subjectivity - without becoming objective: "Saasnart jeg 
taler, udtrykker jeg det Almene, og naar jeg ikke gjør det, saa kan Ingen forstaae 
mig."
59
  
 
What lies implicit in this is the thought that we can only communicate to one another 
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that which is shared by the both of us. And emotions are, by their very nature, 
intrinsic to a subject. They are directed at a specific subject, and exist only as this 
specific subject's emotions. They, as exactly the particular emotions that they are, 
cannot be experienced by anyone else. They are not something shared. Analogously, 
the religious Absolute is also bound to a specific subject in the same manner. Like an 
emotion it cannot be shared directly through speech, but what is more, if one attempts 
to represent it through speech, to make it into something one can share in, something 
universal, then it stops being what it is. Now this kind of sharing is actually possible 
with emotions, but if one attempts it with the religiously Absolute, then this Absolute 
becomes mediated by the universal, and thereby, it attempts to become expressed at 
what is an ethical level. Which is impossible. As it would then betray its inherently 
subjective nature and stop being the religiously Absolute. 
 
Let me illustrate with the case of Abraham and Isaac: If Abraham, who is in the 
religious sphere, were to attempt to straightforwardly defend his own conduct by 
explicitly referring to his religious Absolute, he would end up making an ethical 
fallacy. For he would attempt to express his Absolute through thought and words, 
which we have already seen, are universal, that is, he would attempt to express his 
Absolute mediated by the universal. But then he would, pr. definition, enter into the 
ethical sphere, which is precisely the sphere of the Absolute interpreted universally 
(interpreted by the universal). And he would, moreover, make a statement that runs 
counter to the ethical as such. For as it is the command to sacrifice Isaac, his only son, 
that he attempts to defend, this cannot be understood as an expression of universal 
duty, followingly the ethical condemns it. Quoting Kierkegaard: "Saasnart da 
Abraham vil udtrykke sig i det Almene, saa maa han sige, at hans Situation er en 
Anfægtelse, thi han har intet høiere Udtryk af det Almene, der staaer over det 
Almene, han overtræder."
60
 
 
In sum this means that the justifications open to the religious state cannot be properly 
expressed through language, and therefore not at all, as the justifications come out of 
an inherently subjective and personal relationship with the Absolute. The character of 
the religiously Absolute is to be a subjective Absolute. 
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Let us now for a moment leave both the ethicist and the religious aside, and turn to the 
aesthetician. The aesthetical is namely man's natural sphere, in the sense that the 
aesthetical forces are the ones that naturally dominates his behaviour, and shines 
through as the motivating factor for his actions - just think of children, and their 
impulse-based conduct. This make it a natural starting point for a wider investigation 
into the interrelations of the spheres and their different relations to the Absolute, with 
the final goal in mind to get a clearer picture of the specific relationship between the 
ethical and the religious. 
 
Starting off, we must first of all observe that in contradistinction to both the ethicist 
and the religious, the aesthetician does not relate to the Absolute at all. As the 
aesthetician is foremostly occupied with his own subjective emotional states - he is an 
hedonist, of sorts. Though not necessarily a barbaric and crude one in the spirit of a 
run-of-the-mill Bacchus, or Dionysus, for Kierkegaard's typical aesthetic lives as 
much through his imagination as he does through actual behaviour, and he takes as 
much pleasure from imagined pleasures as he does real ones - that is, he gratifies his 
needs as much through imagined narratives, as he does real acts, but no matter what 
he does, and how he does it, the point stays the same that to him everything revolves 
around his own subjective state of contentment. We can actually say that for the 
aesthetician it is his own state of pleasure that is his Absolute. But we must then also 
understand that this is a false Absolute. Considering that this state has none of the 
characteristics that the Absolute has: It is not infinite, nor is it categorical. It is not 
something we could hope to capture with the metaphor: "a fixed and stable point", nor 
something we could speak of as "unchanging". As a matter of fact, it is the opposite of 
these descriptions. As an emotional state is something inherently unstable. Something 
that necessarily changes with the changing circumstances that the individual finds 
himself to be in, and that naturally passes over as time goes on. As such, the 
aesthetician does not seriously relate to anything Absolute, even if he attempts to, by 
treating his own state of satisfaction as the meaning of his life. And as a consequence, 
he leads a flickering life - always in the grip of whatever contingently happen to 
dominate him at a specific moment. 
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This nature of the aesthetical character is clearly pointed out to us by Judge Wilhelm 
(an ethicist) in a section of Enten/Eller where he, in an address to the aesthetician A, 
attempts to draw a psychological profile of A: "Du er en Hader af Virksomhed i Livet; 
meget rigtigt, thi for at der skal være Mening i denne, maa Livet have Continuitet, og 
det mangler Dit Liv. Du beskjeftiger Dig med Dine Studier, det er sandt, Du er 
endogsaa flittig; men det er kun for Din egen Skyld, og skeer saa lidet teleologisk som 
muligt. Forøvrigt er Du ledig, Du staaer, ligesom hine Arbeidere i Evangeliet, ledig 
paa Torvet, Du stikker Hænderne i Lommen og betragter Livet. Nu hviler Du i 
Fortvivlelsen, Intet beskjeftiger Dig, Du gaaer ikke af Veien for Noget, "om man rev 
Tagsteen ned, jeg gik dog ikke af Veien." Du er som en Døende, Du døer daglig, ikke 
i den dybe alvorlige Betydning, hvori man ellers tager dette Ord, men Livet har tabt 
sin Realitet og "Du beregner altid Din Levetid fra den ene Opsigelses-Dag til den 
anden." Du lader Alt passere Dig forbi, det gjør intet Indtryk, men nu kommer der 
pludselig 'oget, der griber Dig, en Idee, en Situation, et Smiil af en ung Pige, og nu 
er Du "med"; thi som Du ved visse Leiligheder ikke er "med", saa er Du til andre 
Tider med og i alle Maader til Tjeneste. Overalt hvor der er en Begivenhed, der er Du 
med. Du bærer Dig ad i Livet, som Du pleier at gjøre i Trængsel, "Du arbeider Dig 
ind i den tætteste Klynge, seer, om muligt, at blive trykket op over de Andre, saa Du 
kommer til at ligge ovenpaa dem, er Du først deroppe, saa gjør Du Dig det saa 
beqvemt som muligt, og saaledes lader Du Dig ogsaa bære igjennem Livet." Men naar 
Trængselen har ophørt, naar Begivenheden er forbi, saa staaer Du atter paa 
Gadehjørnet og seer paa Verden."
61
 
 
As you can see, what Wilhelm chastises A for, is, as he puts it, his lack of continuity. 
The fact that A's behaviour is not an expression of an invariable code, of a true 
commitment, but is a pure function of his circumstances. He lacks, we can say, a 
deep-rooted and clearly defined will that steers him in a fixed direction. Instead, he 
dances in tune to whatever happens to dominate him at a certain moment. As Judge 
Wilhelm writes a little bit later on in Enten/Eller: "Det æsthetiske Individ betrager sig 
selv i sin Concretion og distingverer nu inter et inter. Han seer Noget som tilfældigt 
ham tilhørende, Andet som væsentligt. Denne Distinction er imidlertid yderst relativ; 
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thi saalænge et Menneske blot lever æsthetisk, tilhører Alt ham egentlig lige 
tilfældigt, og det er blot Mangel paa Energi, naar et æsthetisk Individ fastholder denne 
Distinction."
62
 
 
The step out of the sphere of the aesthetic and into the ethical is a conscious reaction 
to this frivolity that characterizes the aesthetic condition - to its lack of seriousness 
and direction. One makes the step, if one comes to see that in placing one's own 
emotions at the centre of one's life, one is forced vacillate as they vacillate in tune 
with the world surrounding one. One makes the step, therefore, if one grows tired of 
the continual eruption of despair that invariably comes over one each time the 
emotional pendulum swings, and the moment of joy passes. One makes the step, if 
one begins to reflect on the fact that one has structured oneself about something 
inherently fleeting and impermanent - one's emotions - and one seeks to compensate 
for this. 
 
As the state the aesthetician is in is caused by his devotion to his own emotional 
satisfaction, it is only natural that in order for him to compensate for this, the 
aesthetician devotes himself to something inherently different from what he is now 
devoted to. That is, as an act of compensation, he goes from being devoted to what is 
truly subjective in him, his emotions, to what is not subjective at all - to the universal. 
That is, the ethical. In order to remedy his plight, he naturally seeks out the negative 
complement of his current ideal, so as to definitely escape it. And this means in the 
case of the aesthetician that he replaces a standard that is subjective and capricious, 
with one that is communal and constant. Thereby, he wins an Absolute. And 
everything he does, so long as he holds himself to his new standard, will be the 
expression of a stable code. Judge Wilhelm expresses this as follows: "Den, der lever 
ethisk, har seet sig selv, kjender sig selv, gjennemtrænger med sin Bevidsthed sin hele 
Concretion, tillader ikke ubestemte Tanker at pusle om i ham, ikke fristende 
Muligheder at adsprede ham med deres Gjøgleværk, han er ikke sig selv som et 
Hexebrev, der snart kan komme Eet ud af, snart et Andet alt eftersom man vender og 
dreier det."
63
 And as he notes a few pages before that passage, but in exactly the same 
vein: "Om det ethiske Individ kan man sige, at han er som det stille Vand, der har den 
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dybe Grund, hvorimod Den, der lever æsthetisk, blot er overfladisk bevæget."
64
 
 
In passing we can note that the mechanism that here is in play, when the aesthetician 
becomes an ethicist, is again nothing other than a Hegelian negation. A movement of 
change by virtue of contradiction, wherein one extreme is exchanged for this 
extreme's radical other. 
 
Now in order to relate this to the next step of the process, to the step from the ethical 
and into the religious, I want to re-introduce two terms that I used before without 
placing overtly much weight on them. Namely, that in forming part of the aesthetical 
sphere, a subject is in his outlook on life mainly directed towards his own interior, or 
inside. As he in regard to his own behaviour judges what he ought, and ought not to 
do, with references to its emotional effects upon him. In contradistinction to this, in 
virtue of gaining admittance to the ethical sphere, a subject is directed out beyond 
himself, to what is exterior to him, or outside of him. As I am going to say, he is 
directed towards his outside, as opposed to his inside. The reason for this, is that it is 
now in regard to how one universally ought to behave that he makes his personal 
judgements about what he is to do, and not with reference to anything immanent 
within his subjectivity. (As he is a subject, and hence, is in himself something 
particular, what is universal is naturally something different from what he is, and 
hence, it is something that could be said to be outside of him, as it does not belong to 
him, in an immanent sense.) 
 
In the first instance, the standard to which he holds himself is, therefore, interior to 
him in an unproblematic sense, and in the second, this standard is once removed from 
him, as it does not relate directly to him as the particular subject that he is, but relates 
to him in virtue of him falling under the category of a general moral agent. We can 
formulate this as follows: in the aesthetical sphere the subject relates to himself as the 
subject that he is, but in the ethical he relates to himself in virtue of the fact that falls 
beneath the ethical domain. In the aesthetical, the subject relates to himself on an 
immediate level, in the ethical, on a mediate one - he relates to himself in virtue of 
belonging to a general category. 
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Let me give a quote from Kierkegaard that highlights the matter: "Først naar Individet 
selv er det Almene, først da lader det Ethiske sig realisere. Det er denne 
Hemmelighed, der ligger i Samvittigheden, det er denne Hemmelighed, det 
individuelle Liv har med sig selv, at det paa eengang er et individuelt Liv og tillige 
det Almene, om ikke umiddelbart som saadant, saa dog efter sin Mulighed. Den der 
betragter Livet ethisk, han seer det Almene, og Den der lever ethisk, han udtrykker i 
sit Liv det Almene, han gjør sig til det almene Menneske, ikke derved, at han affører 
sig sin Concretion, thi saa bliver han til slet Intet, men derved, at han ifører sig den og 
gjennemtrænger den med det Almene. Det almene Menneske er nemlig ikke et 
Phantom, men ethvert Menneske er det almene Menneske, det vil sige, ethvert 
Menneske er anviist den Vei, ad hvilken han bliver det almene Menneske. Den der 
lever æsthetisk, han er det tilfældige Menneske, han troer at være det fuldkomne 
Menneske derved, at han er det eneste Menneske; Den, der lever ethisk, arbeider hen 
til at blive det almene Menneske."
65
 
 
This way of viewing the matter lets us see that though the subject by becoming an 
ethicist gains an Absolute and thereby wins continuity in his existence, which is to say 
that he rises above the instability and despair that belongs to aesthetical sphere, his 
conduct has, instead, a stable mainspring in the ethical, he, nonetheless, is now forced 
to deal with a new problem: The subject in question has namely invariably become 
alienated from itself. For in winning the ethical, it binds itself to a standard that is, as I 
have noted, outside of it and that, moreover, directly contrasts with who it is, 
subjectively speaking. So that it by relieving itself of one state of tension, the one that 
comes from not relating to any form Absolute at all, it now gains another such state - 
which is that it continually must bow down to an impersonal Absolute, and relate to 
itself as a general category, even though the subject is manifestly a particular and 
incommensurable someone. 
 
The reality of this situation is, curiously enough, attested to by Judge Wilhelm 
himself, when he says the following: "Seer man det Ethiske, udenfor Personligheden 
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og i et udvortes Forhold til denne, saa har man opgivet Alt, saa har man fortvivlet."
66
 
Though his point, in the context he is speaking, is that the ethicist precisely does not 
have the ethical outside of himself: "Det ethiske Individ har da ikke Pligten udenfor 
sig, men i sig..."
67
 But this is nothing but a misconception on his part - that is, at least, 
my understanding of it. For it must be remembered in all dealings with Judge 
Wilhelm that he is a convinced ethicist. He has committed himself categorically to the 
ethical. And if he is to uphold this categorical commitment he cannot, of course, find 
any faults with it. If so, there would invariably and necessarily come a time when he 
doubted it, but then, with this doubt, he would loose the main pillar of his existence, 
and be thrown head over heels into the bleakest form of despair. Followingly, he does 
not find any flaws with the ethical. He is blinded towards it because of all that he has 
invested in it. It is the meaning of his life. 
 
To see that what Judge Wilhelm says in the above, that the ethical does not represent 
something essentially at odds with the subjectivity of man, to see that this is not the 
general approach that Kierkegaard adheres to, one can consult the book that is 
(probably) meant as the religious complement to the aesthetical and ethical views 
featured in Enten/Eller, namely: Frygt og Bæven. (All three books were published in 
the year 1843.) For here Kierkegaard states through the voice of Johannes de silentio, 
whom is a religious author, and therefore, in accordance with the understanding 
proposed here, he is not committed to the ethical, and in virtue of this able to give a 
more neutral treatment of it, he states: "Det Ethiske er som saadant det Almene, som 
det Almene er det igjen det Aabenbare. Den Enkelte er som umiddelbar sandselig og 
sjælelig bestemmet den Skjulte. Hans ethiske Opgave er da den, at vikle sig ud af sin 
Skjulthed og blive aabenbar i det Almene."
68
 
 
Hence, it is simply not the case what Judge Wilhelm upholds, that individual can 
become truly one with the ethical. For the ethical is the universal, and therefore, it is 
what is accessible to all and revealed to all, it is what is intersubjective. It is precisely 
not subjective. And any individual whatever is, in his very essence, a subject, 
something turned in upon himself - something hidden from everyone else. A fact that 
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maybe gets it most powerful attestation in Begrebet Angest where Kierkegaard writes 
the following: "Først naar Begrebet af det Enkelte er givet, først da er der Tale om det 
Selviske, men uagtet der har levet talløse Millioner af saadanne Selv'er, saa kan ingen 
Videnskab sige, hvad det er, uden igjen at udsige det ganske almindeligt. Og dette er 
Livets Vidunderlighed, at ethvert Menneske, der agter paa sig selv, veed, hvad ingen 
Videnskab veed, da han veed, hvo han selv er..."
69
 
 
That we can know ourselves in a sense that no science can know us, and that is to say, 
in a sense in which no other person can know us, attests to the fact that we are 
disclosed to ourselves on a level that remains essentially hidden from the world at 
large. We have an immediate relation to who we are, that is not shared by any other 
finite being whatsoever. As they always relate to us, as we relate to them, and that is 
to say mediately, by means of one's perception and cognition. Now, it is true that we 
are not wholly transparent to ourselves, and that there exists motives and impulses in 
us that escape us, that are part of our unconscious, so that we also have to relate to 
ourselves empirically on some issues. But that is not what is at issue here. The point is 
that we have an immediate and constant access to our own being. As we are that very 
being to which we relate to. And we are never separated from ourselves in the sense 
that we are separated from every other thing in the world, and nor do we relate to 
ourselves through the epistemical apparatus that guides our movements among these 
things. 
 
What is implied in this, in our special relation to ourselves, is that we stand in an 
immediate relation to ourselves as the particular object that we are - it is, furthermore, 
precisely this relation that makes us into a subject. The relation is what that secures 
that we have an "interior", a private space to which only we have access, as the 
"space" in question is nothing other than the closed relationship of ourselves to 
ourselves. 
 
What this means, to Kierkegaard, is that we stand in a position to relate to our own 
singular uniqueness. And only we stand in this position. No one else can relate to us 
in this sense. As we in turn can relate to no other being's singular uniqueness. For in 
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as much as we relate to other particulars, and in as much as others relate to us, the 
relationship in question is one in which an existent relates to another and separate 
existent. Which in no sense can be an immediate relationship, as one in a relationship 
to an other totally lacks the constancy that we find in one's relation to oneself. Instead 
one's relation to a separate being is mediated by one's perception and one's 
understanding. It is formed out of a limited set of empirical data which one interprets 
and forms an understanding of. Therefore, we do not relate to a particular that we 
encounter as it is in itself, but we form an opinion of what this particular is - what its 
essence is. And thereby we subordinate it to an universal. (An essence is an 
universal.) And this is really what Kierkegaard is saying in the following quote, that I 
have given once before, but that it is pertinent to give also here: "...man kan ikke 
tænke et enkelt Menneske, men kun Begrebet Menneske."
70
 Which is to say that you 
cannot relate to a particular man that is different from yourself, without necessarily 
thinking of him as "a man" - which is to subordinate him to the concept of man, to 
identify him with an universal. 
 
The essence of this discussion leads up to the following: We are, everyone of us, 
singularly unique. And we, and only we ourselves, can and must relate to our own 
uniqueness. This is a part of our nature as beings endowed with subjectivity. But, and 
here comes the difficulty with regard to the ethical: "...Den, der lever ethisk, arbeider 
hen til at blive det almene Menneske."
71
 Thereby, the tension and despair that belongs 
to the ethical sphere is given by necessity. For we are not universal, we are particular, 
unique and singular, and the ethical will followingly always be something that stands 
opposed to our given nature. It is an outside to our inside. And if we live ethically, as 
Judge Wilhelm inadvertently attests to, we live in despair - as we live as something 
we are not. 
 
The religious sphere then, is a response to this tension and despair inherent in the 
ethical. And it can be said to lie beyond, or to exceed, the ethical - and thereby 
escaping the despair that belongs to it - by allowing a subject to come into a direct 
relationship with the Absolute, unmediated by the universal. In virtue of this, it is a 
sort of synthesis of the two foregoing spheres that avoids the flaws of both. It is the 
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sphere of the subjective Absolute. A sphere in which one is, as one is in the 
aesthetical sphere, directed towards one's subjective self, while at the same time being 
in possession of the Absolute, like one is in the ethical sphere. 
 
This has a couple of consequences that I would like to draw attention to: Firstly, that, 
as we have already been made aware of, a religious justification of one's action is, in 
virtue of being a religious one, incommunicable. This comes, for example, clearly to 
the fore in the following quote: "Hvorledes existerer da Abraham? Han troede. Dette 
er det Paradox, ved hvilket han bliver paa Spidsen, hvilket han ikke kan gjøre tydeligt 
for nogen Anden, thi Paradoxet er, at han som den Enkelte sætter sig i et absolut 
Forhold til det Absolute. Er han berettiget? Hans Berettigelse er igjen det Paradoxe; 
thi dersom han er det, er han det ikke i Kraft af at være noget Almeent, men i Kraft af 
at være den Enkelte."
72
 A religious justification is, as we see, essentially tied up with 
the subjective level, and therefore also necessarily tied up with a specific subject. As 
the subjective level only exist in specific subjects, and not in any way universally. 
Hence, such a justification is only accessible through a specific someone's interior, 
which makes it a wholly private affair. Something we, that are different from this 
subject, are incapable of relating to. Just as, to remind you of an analogy that I used a 
little while back, we cannot in a straightforward sense feel this person's emotions. As 
Kierkegaard says: "..den, der gaaer Troens trange Vei, ham kan Ingen raade, Ingen 
forstaae."
73
 
 
The second consequence that I would like to draw attention to is what this inherently 
subjective character of the religious sphere has to say in relation to how one is to 
judge the nature of Abraham's actions, and to how it relates to the interpretation of the 
parable of Abraham and Isaac as such. For to remind you of Kierkegaard's strategy, 
what saves the parable is that it is not meant to be interpreted ethically. What 
Abraham does is suspended from the ethical as the act is an expression of a sphere of 
existence that lies beyond the ethical one. What Abraham does is the result of a 
personal communion with God. He acts upon a personally given command that has 
the paradoxical quality of being absolute, as it originates with the Absolute - God - 
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and yet valid only for him. The command given is something that has to be obeyed 
unconditionally just like Kant's Categorical Imperative, but unlike this Imperative, it 
is not something valid for anyone besides Abraham himself. As it is an expression of 
Abraham's subjective relation to the Absolute. 
 
It is in this that we can see how the religious is beyond the ethical. In that it allows for 
an individual to interact with the Absolute on a personal basis, so that it does not 
demand of it that it sacrifices its inherent individuality in order to appropriate a stable 
continuity in its existence. Which is precisely what it must do in the ethical - as it 
there must realize itself as "det almene Menneske". Instead, in the religious, it gains 
this stability and continuity through its personal relationship with God. (In this regard 
it interesting to note that the standard by which one judges the three different spheres 
up against each other is how well they let the individual individually express the 
Absolute. The aesthetical does not have an Absolute, but it has individuality. The 
ethical has an Absolute, but at the cost of one's individuality. While the religious is 
the ideal sphere where the Absolute and the individual coincide. And really, the whole 
of Kierkegaard's oeuvre can be seen in this light, as a body work that attempts to 
reconcile man's subjectivity with the presence of an unconditional Absolute. For it 
must of course be clear to anyone that has thought seriously about the matter that such 
an Absolute has to be a negative vis-à-vis a subject itself. As it has to be something 
different from the subject - if it were not, that would mean that the subject itself in 
some manner would be the Absolute, something we have seen not to be the case 
through Kierkegaard's portrayal of the aesthetic. It does not belong to the inherently 
subjective to be absolute. Therefore, the Absolute will be something that is different 
from the subject, and that yet has an utmost significance for it. The Absolute will 
therefore be something that limits and constrains the subject, that forces it to conform 
to a certain standard, which is systematically different from the subject's own will. 
And the whole of Kierkegaard's problem may be to find a way by which such a 
standard is not an outside to a subjective inside. His answer being the religious.) 
 
Now, in the context we are here, the thing to observe is the inherently private and 
subjective nature of the religiously Absolute. For whatever one learns through this 
relationship, it will be an example of a truth of what one has to do that is valid only 
for a specific subject alone. That is, religiously speaking Abraham's actions are not 
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something worthy of emulation. Not because Abraham is not a hero of the religious, 
but because emulation makes no sense in the religious sphere. What Abraham does is 
an expression of his relationship with the Absolute. And this can say nothing of our 
potential relationship with it, and what it will demand of us. 
 
This state of affairs is attestified to by Kierkegaard in the following quote: "Man 
indbilder sig vel, at den Enkelte kan gjøre sig forstaaelig for en anden Enkelt, der er i 
samme Casus. En saadan Betragtning var utænkelig, hvis man ikke paa saa mange 
Maader i vor Tid søgte at snige sig lumskelig ind i det Store. Den ene Troens Ridder 
kan slet ikke hjælpe den anden. Enten bliver den Enkelte selv en Troens Ridder 
derved, at han tager Paradoxet paa sig, eller han bliver det aldrig. Compagniskab i 
disse Regioner er aldeles utænkeligt. Enhver nærmere Explication af hvad der skal 
forstaaes ved Isaak kan den Enkelte bestandig kun give sig selv. Og hvis man endog 
nok saa nøie kunde bestemme, almindeligt talt, hvad der skulde forstaaes ved Isaak 
(hvilket da forøvrigt vilde være den latterligste Selvmodsigelse, at bringe den Enkelte, 
der netop staaer udenfor det Almene, ind under almindelige Bestemmelser, idet han 
skal handle netop som den Enkelte, der er udenfor det Almene) saa vil den Enkelte 
dog aldrig kunne forvisse sig derom ved Andre, end ved sig selv som den Enkelte."
74
 
 
But this means that, when read correctly, the parable of Abraham does in no way 
condone murder. That murder becomes religously justified in the parable, does, for 
one, not override that it ethically is murder. The religious does not change the ethical, 
it steps beyond it.
75
 And, at the same time, that Abraham is commanded to perform 
murder in the name of God cannot mean anything to us, religiously speaking. For to 
think that it does, would be to interpret the parable in the sense that it sets forth some 
universal principle that is valid for all in virtue of their belonging to the religious 
sphere. But there exists no such universal principles in the religious sphere. The 
religious exists only for isolated individuals. There is no community, and no shared 
dogma, at this level of existence. There is only yourself and God. And to doubt the 
commandments that are given you, religiously, is to doubt God. 
 
This, I believe, is the essence of Kierkegaard's defence of the parable of Abraham and 
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Isaac. What Abraham does takes places beyond the ethical, that is, beyond our 
intersubjectively accessible categories of good and evil, and beyond what we can 
relate to communally. That he is right in doing as he does is, therefore, something 
only accessible to him. We cannot relate to his justification. Followingly, his action 
cannot become justified for us. We can see it as a religious act, and thereby believe 
that it ultimately is justified in a sense private to him, but we cannot make more sense 
of it than that. It stops there. We cannot even be absolutely certain that he is religious 
in doing what he does. That is also something only accessible to him. To quote 
Kierkegaard: "Om den Enkelte nu virkelig ligger i en Anfægtelse eller han er Troens 
Ridder, det kan kun den Enkelte selv afgjøre."
76
 
 
The essence of this is the fact that what Abraham does it belongs to Abraham to do. 
Not to us, not ethically, and not religiously either.  He is, by being a Knight of Faith, 
in a state of perfect isolation: "Den sande Troens Ridder er altid den absolute 
Isolation..."
77
 
 
Now, a consequence of Kierkegaard's interpretation is that the religious is capable of 
justifying the unethical as something right. Though not right in an ethical sense, but 
right in a religious sense, which outweighs the ethical without being commensurable 
with it. The thing to understand, paradoxical as it may seem, is that that does not tell 
us anything general about the religious, as it is nothing general to tell. The religious, 
by being defined as something inherently subjective, does not have any general 
characteristics, other than that of not having any general characteristics. The 
consequence of this is that Kierkegaard cannot be taken to defend the general 
conclusion that it is right for the religious to murder in the name of the religious. That 
would be to say to much. It would be to interpret the parable of Abraham and Isaac as 
a general statement about the nature of the religious sphere, and what is allowed 
within it. Which is to not understand the nature of what the religious is. All we can 
say in this regard is that what is done religously takes place beyond the ethical, and in 
relation to it the ethical is suspended. That is all. What it contains of positive laws and 
decrees is not for anyone to know, other than in himself, and in his own sense. Which 
                                                                                                                                                                      
75
 Kierkegaard, Frygt og Bæven in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 67. 
76
 Kierkegaard, Frygt og Bæven in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 74. 
77
 Kierkegaard, Frygt og Bæven in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 74. 
  83 
is his alone and not valid for anyone else. 
 
Now, to push these considerations one step further down the path that we have set out 
to follow: Seeing as we have come upon an understanding that lets us see Abraham's 
actions in a different light than the ethical, so that we suspend our ethical judgements 
in relation to him, the next question becomes: What are we to positively admire in 
him? 
 
The problem that we started out with was that it is a dangerous game to admire 
Abraham, as it comes close to admiring murder (or admiring the intention to kill). The 
solution to this, that I have presented, is that Abraham's actions does not belong to the 
ethical sphere, it is done in accordance with a sphere that lies beyond the ethical, and 
so, what Abraham does, though ethically a murder, is not murder, if viewed correctly 
and in accordance with the inner machinations that produce the action in question. To 
express it figuratively, he is acting in accordance with a sphere of existence in which 
different "rules and regulations" apply than the ethical ones. And I speak of this as a 
figurative way of expressing it, because there does not really exist anything that we 
meaningfully can call "rules and regulations" in this sphere at all. Everything that is 
done, is done by virtue of a direct and personal relationship to God. And in as much 
as one belong to the sphere, one does not relate to anything else than God. As a 
religious individual one lives in perfect isolation from others and the general world 
surrounding one. One's reasons for acting and reacting belong to oneself, and to God, 
and no one else. 
 
It is this that is meant by that phrase that I have quoted often enough: "Troen er 
nemlig dette Paradox, at den Enkelte er høiere end det Almene..." To be religious, is 
to be beyond the universal, to be beyond what it is possible to interact with on an 
intersubjective, or communal, basis. And so, it is to be isolated from others. But this 
isolation is much more radical than a mere inability on the part of others to understand 
the motives for what one is doing. It must be remembered that in virtue of belonging 
to the religious sphere, one has left behind one both the ethical and the aesthetical. 
Which means that what one does, when performing some action, is neither motivated 
by a concern for one's emotional well-being, that is, it is not aesthetically motivated, 
and nor is it motivated by an understanding of what is ethically right. It is not 
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dependent upon one's simple subjective drives, nor upon the inherently communal, 
but springs out of one's personal relationship to the Absolute itself. One acts and 
reacts, as a religious person, in virtue of a wholly private relationship with God. One 
has bound up one's life with a something that is beyond everything else. And one 
becomes, therefore, as a consequence of this, irresponsive both to the immediate 
world that surrounds one - which one relates to emotionally - and to the ethical. 
 
And here we have the answer to the question I just asked: In admiring Abraham, this, 
and precisely this, is what one admires: His isolation. The fact that his actions and 
responses does not seem to directly spring out of his interaction with the world 
surrounding him, nor with what we know to be ethically right, but seems instead to 
spring out of something other than this. Something to which we cannot immediately 
relate. Which is what betrays his faith. As Kierkegaard says: "Om den Enkelte nu 
virkelig ligger i en Anfægtelse eller han er Troens Ridder, det kan kun den Enkelte 
selv afgjøre. Imidlertid lod der sig dog ud af Paradoxet construere nogle Kjendetegn, 
som ogsaa den kan forstaae, der ikke er deri. Den sande Troens Ridder er altid den 
absolute Isolation..."
78
 
 
If we now were to go a little more deeply into the story of Abraham and Isaac, and 
expound upon the personal details involved, specifically of Abraham's love for Isaac, 
the isolation that belongs to the religious sphere would come starkly to the fore. 
Abraham's reaction pattern, and by that I mean his reaction upon being given the 
command to sacrifice his son, his reaction to having to collect the knife needed, and 
gather the wood necessary, to having, moreover, to ride beside Isaac for many days - 
Isaac all the time oblivious to what is taking place, asking questions, and so forth - 
and, at the very end, and contrary to all Abraham's expectations, to not having to 
sacrifice Isaac, Abraham's reaction to all of these extreme happenings is namely one 
of calm and detachment. Which is to say: Abraham has faith. Abraham is, as I will 
say, isolated. For there is a sense in which all of these things does not truly concern 
him, even though nothing concerns him more, as he has unflinching faith that God 
will set things aright in the end. 
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Let me give a rather lengthy quote from Kierkegaard to attest to what I have now 
stated: "Hvis jeg da (i Qualitet af tragisk Helt; thi høiere kan jeg ikke komme) var 
bleven tilsagt til en saadan extraordinair Kongereise som den til Morija-Bjerget, jeg 
veed vel, hvad jeg havde gjort. Jeg havde ikke været feig nok til at blive hjemme, 
havde heller ikke ligget og drevet paa Landeveien, havde heller ei glemt Kniven, at 
der kunde blive lidt Sinkeri, jeg er temmelig forvisset om, at jeg havde været paa 
Klokkeslettet, havt Alt i Orden - maaskee var jeg snarere kommen for tidlig, at det 
snart kunde være overstaaet. Men jeg veed tillige, hvad jeg fremdeles havde gjort. Jeg 
havde i samme Øieblik, som jeg besteg Hesten, sagt til mig selv: nu er Alt tabt, Gud 
fordrer Isaak, jeg offrer ham, med ham al min Glæde - Dog er Gud Kjærlighed og 
vedbliver at være det for mig; thi i Timeligheden kan Gud og jeg ikke tale sammen, vi 
have intet Sprog tilfælleds. Maaskee vil En eller Anden i vor Tid være taabelig nok, 
misundelig nok paa det Store, til at ville indbilde sig og mig, at hvis jeg virkelig 
havde gjort dette, da havde jeg gjort det endnu større, end hvad Abraham gjorde; thi 
min uhyre Resignation var langt mere ideal og poetisk end Abrahams Smaalighed. Og 
dog er dette den største Usandhed; thi min uhyre Resignation var Surrogatet for 
Troen. Jeg kunde da heller ikke gjøre mere end den uendelige Bevægelse for at finde 
mig selv og atter hvile i mig selv. Jeg havde da heller ikke elsket Isaak, saaledes som 
Abraham elskede. At jeg var resolut til at gjøre Bevægelsen, kunde bevise mit Mod 
menneskeligt talt, at jeg elskede ham af min ganske Sjæl er Forudsætningen, uden 
hvilken det Hele bliver en Misgjerning, men jeg elskede dog ikke som Abraham; thi 
da havde jeg holdt igjen selv i det sidste Minut, uden at jeg derfor var kommen for 
silde paa Morija-Bjerget. Jeg havde fremdeles ved min Adfærd fordærvet hele 
Historien; thi hvis jeg havde faet Isaak igjen, da havde jeg været i Forlegenhed. Det, 
der faldt Abraham lettest, vilde falde mig svært, det igjen at være glad ved Isaak! thi 
den, der med hele sin Sjæls Uendelighed, proprio motu et propriis auspiciis, har gjort 
den uendelige Bevægelse og ikke kan gjøre mere, han beholder kun Isaak i Smerten.  
 
Men hvad gjorde Abraham? Han kom hverken for tidlig eller for sildig. Han besteg 
Æslet, han reed langsom hen ad Veien. I al den Tid troede han; han troede, at Gud 
ikke vilde fordre Isaak af ham, medens han dog var villig til at offre ham, naar det 
forlangtes. Han troede i Kraft af det Absurde; thi menneskelig Beregning kunde der 
ikke være Tale om, og det var jo det Absurde, at Gud, som fordrede det af ham, i 
næste Øieblik skulde tilbagekalde Fordringen. Han besteg Bjerget, endnu i det Øieblik 
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da Kniven blinkede, da troede han - at Gud ikke vilde fordre Isaak. Han blev da vel 
overrasket ved Udfaldet, men han havde gjennem en Dobbelt-Bevægelse naaet hen til 
sin første Tilstand, og derfor modtog han Isaak gladere end den første Gang."
79
 
 
The thing to admire in the story of Abraham is, therefore, not that he is willing to 
sacrifice Isaac for his faith, it is that he is willing to sacrifice Isaac without resigning 
his love for him. That he is able to get him back with exactly the same heart as he 
gives him away. It is this paradox of his psyche that we admire. That he can perform, 
what seems to us as, something paradoxical with utter conviction. That he is willing 
to sacrifice Isaac, and yet he does not believe that Isaac will be sacrificed. As this 
points towards Abraham's isolation from the world we know, and his devotion to 
something beyond us. To the Absolute in itself - to God. (Though it does not, of 
course, prove such a relation - for that would be to make the religious 
intersubjectively accessible, which it is not. It merely points towards it, as I have said. 
And it is, in the end, forever ambiguous as to whether Abraham is a saint or a 
madman and murderer.
80
) 
 
This concludes what I have to say on the matter of Frygt og Bæven in general. As we 
have now come up to the point wherein my explanation of Frygt og Bæven touches 
upon the matter that started us down this path in the first place - the theme of 
emotional autonomy.  
 
I hope I will not raise any eye-brows by re-introducing this term at this point. For to 
me it is quite clear that Abraham's isolation, the fact that he acts and reacts in virtue of 
his personal relation to the Absolute, and not in virtue of anything else, entails that he 
is in a state of emotional autonomy, generally speaking. Now this is not to say that he 
does not react and respond to what takes place in the world surrounding him. 
Manifestly, he does. But he does not do this in a sense that is straightforwardly 
emotional - that is aesthetical, nor ethical, but precisely religious. As Kierkegaard 
says of Abraham: "Han handler i Kraft af det Absurde..."
81
 He relates to his 
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surroundings, and responds to them, with a view to what he believes is the ultimate 
truth of their reality - that God exists and that he will secure that everything falls into 
their right and proper place in the end. Which means, in effect, that whatever happens, 
Abraham has complete faith that it will turn out for the best. As a consequence, his 
will never be thwarted by his surroundings. (It will, at least, never be experienced as 
thwarted by him - which is subjectively the same thing.) Something I interpret as he 
being in a state of emotionally autonomy - as he being in a state wherein it is 
impossible to adversely affect his emotions from the outside. And how could it be 
possible to affect him thus? That would mean that he has lost faith, that he suddenly 
does not believe that it all will turn for the best. But he does believe this, or else he is 
not religious. 
 
 
3.3 - The double movement; or, fixation, resignation - faith 
 
"Abraham gjør nemlig, som tidligere tilstrækkelig udviklet, to Bevægelser. Han gjør 
Resignationens uendelige Bevægelse, og opgiver Isaak, dette kan Ingen forstaae, fordi 
det er et privat Foretagende; men dernæst gjør han i ethvert Moment Troens 
Bevægelse. Dette er hans Trøst. Han siger nemlig: dog vil det ikke skee, eller hvis det 
skeer, da vil Herren give mig en ny Isaak i Kraft nemlig af det Absurde."
82
 
 
The above quote illustrates the rough features of the motion that I spoke of in the 
introduction to Section 3.2 as the additional motion of faith - the first motion being 
the one treated in Chapter 2, through which one actually appropriates an absolute 
belief in God. This new motion, on the other hand, being the one that secures one 
relief from the possibility of experiencing despair. Which is, as I have said all along, 
the crown benefit that one appropriates by becoming religious. 
 
As you can see, in the quote Kierkegaard speaks of two motions, which put together 
form what he in other passages speaks of as a double-motion: Firstly: there is a 
resignation. Secondly: a motion of faith. Through the first motion Abraham resigns 
his love for Isaac, through the next, he wins him back. But not, of course, in the same 
                                                           
82
 Kierkegaard, Frygt og Bæven in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 105. 
  88 
sense that he "had" him the first time. If we were to imagine to ourselves what this 
concretely would look line in view to Abraham's emotional relations to Isaac: The 
double-motion would mean that Abraham, firstly, detaches himself from Isaac. That 
he gives him up, as Kierkegaard phrases it in the above quote, and withdraws the 
emotional investment that he has placed in him. So that Isaac looses what he has of 
significance for him. If want to relate this to a comparable situation, I think it is 
pertinent to think of what takes place in a lover that has been wronged so many times 
by his (or her) significant other, that, as her (or she) is wronged yet again, the lover in 
question simply freezes all of the emotions that he (or she) has and quits - leaves, and 
is over and done with the whole affair. This is not to imply that the two situations are 
completely comparable and isomorphic. They are not. As Abraham in no way is 
wronged by Isaac. The aspect in which they are alike though, is as regards the element 
of resignation - of giving up the beloved party. And in this, I do believe that they are 
expressions of the very same phenomenon. Now, this act of resignation may be the 
finale of the whole affair for our unnamed lover, but not so for Abraham. For next and 
almost at the very same instant in which Abraham resigns, he turns this motion 
around and re-appropriates his emotional bond to Isaac. Not, though, in the sense that 
he simply re-activates the bond that he just severed. If he first had what we might a 
call an immediate emotional bond to Isaac, he now gets a mediate one, as he re-
activates his relation to Isaac through his relation to God. Described in different 
terms, he looses an aesthetical relation to his son, an immediate subjective relation, 
and wins a religiously mediated one. In which his immediate relation is with God, and 
where this relation in turn is the basis for his relation to his son. In virtue of this, 
whatever happens to Isaac, whether by his own volition, or by cause of exterior 
circumstances, it has no consequences for Abraham's relationship to him. As 
Abraham is in the paradoxical state of being detached from him and involved with 
him, both at the one and the same time. Both isolated and committed. Which is the 
Kierkegaardian ideal: "At existere saaledes, at min Modsætning til Existentsen i 
ethvert Øieblik udtrykker sig som den skjønneste og tryggeste Harmoni med den..."
83
 
This, again, to remind you, is why I speak of this state as one of emotional autonomy. 
For no matter what happens, that is, even if the worst happens, that Isaac becomes 
lost, sacrificed, it has no emotional significance for Abraham. For Abraham lives in 
                                                           
83
 Kierkegaard, Frygt og Bæven in Frygt og Bæven; Sygdommen til Døden; Taler, 49. 
  89 
the belief that, if so, then God will bring him back. "Han har fattet den dybe 
Hemmelighed," as Kierkegaard says of another Knight, but no mind, for what he says 
of the individual in question counts for Abraham as well, "at ogsaa i at elske et andet 
Menneske bør man være sig selv nok."
84
 For make no mistake, it precisely this that is 
the general effect of Abraham's belief in God. That he relates to Isaac, not in view to 
the real Isaac - the Isaac that dies, if we follow our imagined course of events - but in 
view to an ideal Isaac that God guarantees for him. If Isaac dies, Isaac is not lost to 
Abraham, for he knows that God will restore him to him. Followingly, that Isaac 
definitely dies and is lost cannot happen to the Isaac that Abraham relates to. Why? 
Because God would not allow it. Because the Isaac that Abraham relates to is given 
him through his belief in God. He has resigned from the real Isaac (the first motion of 
the double-motion here under discussion). And all that Abraham now has is this 
idealization of Isaac that is powered by his belief in the divine. And this makes him 
self-sufficient, even in view to loving another. (And how else, one should asks 
oneself, could one become self-sufficient in regard to love?, which is the explicitly 
stated ideal, other than by precisely divorcing the object in question of its independent 
reality, and turning it into an element of one's own interior.) 
 
This interpretation may, at first glance, seem too fantastic to be an accurate reading of 
Kierkegaard. And I concur in that it may seem that way. But that is only a piece of 
Schein. The truth is that an interpretation of Kierkegaard must take a stand in regard 
to this view, extreme as it may seem, and I will now attempt to argue as to why. I will 
go about this by going through, step-by-step, Kierkegaard's most detailed account of 
the double-movement spoken of above. And thereby show that the Knight of Faith, in 
becoming a Knight of Faith, precisely binds his emotions to idealizations instead of 
real beings – as I have chosen to explain the process – idealizations that get their 
reality for him (and only him), through his relation to God. 
 
As mentioned at the very beginning of Section 3.2, the passage in question is to be 
found in "Foreløbig Expectoration" which is a part of the opening sections of Frygt og 
Bæven. And it details a quite romantic - in the sense of being something typical of the 
Romantic movement - scenario about a poor young man that falls in love with a 
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princess. An impossible match, by all standards. The kind of thing that only happens 
in fairy tales. Which is precisely the heart of the scenario, as this is what confronts the 
young man as he grows conscious of his own feelings: That the object of his love is 
completely ludicrous and fantastic for a man in his situation. It is, quite frankly, an 
impossible love. But it does not go from here to become a story about how the poor 
man wins the impossible, the princess, something that truly would be typically 
romantic, it is a story about how one is too live with the impossibility of winning. 
(Note the connection that arises to what I have said about despair and the religious as 
a natural antidote against this - the story explains how one is to live with the fact of 
failing to conform to one's ideal for oneself.) Kierkegaard's point with it is to portray 
how a true Knight of Faith would deal with this kind of situation, if he were the young 
man in question - or, alternatively put, how the young man in question would deal 
with the situation if he were a Knight of Faith.  
 
There are three main elements, or we can say, steps, stages or motions, to the Knight 
of Faith's reaction: Firstly, there is a stage of fixation. This is a stage that is new to the 
example in question. Kierkegaard does not mention it in relation to Abraham. And it 
consists in a sort preparatory action that lays the ground for the actual double-
movement. So that after this first stage, there follows successively the second and 
third stages, the motions that I have already spoken of in relation to Abraham: 
resignation, and the motion of faith. We will here follow the process through the 
whole logic of its unfolding. 
 
The first step, fixation, takes place after the young man learns of his desire, and 
simultaneously with this, of its impossibility. It consists of a process whereby the 
young man, firstly, evaluates his emotions, making sure that they are an expression of 
a need that he truly cannot let go unfulfilled without failing to somehow realize his 
own subjective nature, and, secondly, he verifies that his wish actually is unrealizable. 
This means that he, in this stage of the overall process, fixates upon the dilemma that 
constitutes his situation so as not to harbour any illusions or faint hopes in regard to it. 
He focuses simply on the bare and naked facts: The significance that the desire for the 
princess has for him as a person, and the objective impossibility of satisfying it. And 
he furthermore focuses his recognition of this state of affairs into a conscious state of 
concentrated despair. Despair, because he comes to see that he has developed an ideal 
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for himself – that of being in a love relation with the princess – that he cannot succeed 
in conforming to. (That it is a personal ideal, and not merely some impulsive fling, is 
what he verifies through the emotional evaluation I mentioned above.) What he does 
at this stage is, therefore, to force himself to look the situation straight in the eye with 
a view to its full significance. From this position, he then, afterwards, performs the 
second motion - that of resignation. 
 
But before we come to that, let me quote from Kierkegaard in order to illustrate this 
first step: "En Ungersvend forelsker sig i en Prindsesse, og hele hans Livs Indhold 
ligger i denne Kjærlighed, og dog er Forholdet et saadant, at den umulig lader sig 
realisere, umuligt lader sig oversætte fra Idealiteten til Realiteten... Han forvisser sig 
først om, at den virkelig er ham Livets Indhold, og hans Sjæl er for sund og for stolt 
til at ødsle det Mindste paa en Ruus. Han er ikke feig, han frygter ikke for at lade den 
snige sig ind i hans lønligste, hans mest afsides Tanker, at lade den snoe sig i utallige 
Slyngninger om ethvert Ligament i hans Bevidsthed - bliver Kjærligheden ulykkelig, 
da vil han aldrig kunne rive sig ud af den. Han føler en salig Vellyst ved at lade 
Kjærligheden gjennemgyse hver hans Nerve, og dog er hans Sjæl høitidelig som 
Dens, der har tømt Giftbægeret og føler, hvorledes Saften gjennemtrænger hver en 
Blodsdraabe, - thi dette Øieblik er Liv og Død. Naar han da saaledes har indsuget hele 
Kjærligheden i sig og fordybet sig i den, da mangler han ikke Mod til at forsøge og 
vove Alt. Han overskuer Livets Forhold, han sammenkalder de hurtige Tanker, der 
som slagvante Duer lyde hvert hans Vink, han svinger Staven over dem, og de styrte 
sig i alle Retninger. Men naar de nu alle vende tilbage, alle som Sorgens Bud og 
forklare ham, at det er en Umulighed, da bliver han stille, han takker dem af, han 
bliver ene og da foretager han sig Bevægelsen. Dersom hvad jeg her siger skal have 
nogen Betydning, da gjælder det om, at Bevægelsen skeer normalt. Ridderen vil da 
for det første have Kraft til at concentrere hele Livets Indhold og Virkelighedens 
Betydning i eet eneste Ønske... Dernæst vil Ridderen have Kraft til at concentrere hele 
Tanke-Operationens Resultat i een Bevidstheds-Akt."
85
 
 
And from this position, he performs the act of resignation. As we have seen in relation 
to Abraham, this means that he gives her up - he accepts the impossibility, and 
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withdraws the emotional investment that he has placed in her, thereby making her 
loose her significance for him. But, though he severs his bonds to the actual person in 
question, the actual living and breathing princess, the Knight of Faith cannot simply, 
Kierkegaard says, leave behind what he has identified as his raison d'être - as his 
ideal. So, in order not to completely fail himself, he keeps what he can of the princess, 
and makes it into a point never to loose sight of his memory of her. That is, as he 
consciously resigns from the exterior person, he simultaneously redirects his feelings 
and emotions towards his own inner image and thought of her. Thereby enabling 
himself to keep the love relation in question alive, abstractly, or I could say 
imaginatively, as a relation to a figure that is confined to the interior of his own mind. 
He comes therefore, through this step, to cherish and adore the thought and image of 
the princess, independently of the actual person. A thought and image which thereby 
becomes something we can straightforwardly denote as a signifier divorced of its 
signified. He cuts his bonds to the princess, thereby distancing himself from the 
signified of his thought, but holds on to this image and thought itself, the signifier, 
and continues his relation, therefore, purely symbolically, that is, through his 
imagination. 
 
As Kierkegaard says: "Ridderen gjør da Bevægelsen, men hvilken? Vil han glemme 
det Hele; thi ogsaa deri ligger jo en Slags Concentration? Nei! thi Ridderen modsiger 
ikke sig selv, og det er en Modsigelse at forglemme hele sit Livs Indhold og dog blive 
den samme. At blive en Anden, føler han ingen Drift til, og anseer det ingenlunde for 
det Store. Kun de lavere Naturer glemme sig selv og blive noget Nyt. Saaledes har 
Sommerfuglen aldeles glemt, at den var Kaalorm, maaskee kan den igjen glemme, at 
den var Sommerfugl saa aldeles, at den kan blive en Fisk. De dybere Naturer glemme 
aldrig sig selv og blive aldrig til Andet end hvad de vare. Ridderen vil da erindre Alt; 
men denne Erindren er netop Smerten, og dog er han i den uendelige Resignation 
forsonet med Tilværelsen. Kjærligheden til hiin Prindsesse blev for ham Udtrykket 
for en evig Kjærlighed, antog en religiøs Charakteer, forklarede sig i en Kjærlighed til 
det evige Væsen, der vel negtede Opfyldelsen, men dog atter forsonede ham i den 
evige Bevidsthed om dens Gyldighed i en Evigheds-Form, som ingen Virkelighed kan 
fratage ham. Daarer og unge Mennesker snakke om, at Alt er muligt for et Menneske. 
Det er imidlertid en stor Vildfarelse. Aandelig talt er Alt muligt, men i Endelighedens 
Verden er der Meget, der ikke er muligt. Dette Umulige gjør imidlertid Ridderen 
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muligt derved, at han udtrykker det aandeligt, men aandeligt udtrykker han det 
derved, at han giver Afkald derpaa. Ønsket, der vilde føre ham ud i Virkeligheden men 
strandede paa Umuligheden, bøies nu indefter, men er derfor ikke tabt, heller ikke 
glemt. Snart er det Ønskets dunkle Rørelser i ham, der vækker Erindringen, snart 
vækker han den selv; thi han er for stolt til at ville, at det, der var hele hans Livs 
Indhold, skulde have været et flygtigt Moments Sag. Han holder denne Kjærlighed 
ung, og den tiltager med ham i Aar og i Skjønhed. Derimod behøver han ingen 
Endelighedens Anledning til dens Fremvæxt. Fra det Øieblik, han har gjort 
Bevægelsen, er Prindsessen tabt. Han behøver ikke disse erotiske Nervezittringer ved 
at see den Elskede o.s.v., han behøver heller ikke i endelig Forstand bestandig at tage 
Afsked med hende, fordi han i evig Forstand erindrer hende, og han veed meget godt, 
at de Elskende, der ere saa forhippede paa endnu engang til Afsked at see hinanden 
for sidste Gang, have Ret i at være forhippede, Ret i at mene, at det er sidste Gang; thi 
de glemmer snarest hinanden. Han har fattet den dybe Hemmelighed, at ogsaa i at 
elske et andet Menneske bør man være sig selv nok. Han tager intet endeligt Hensyn 
mere til hvad Prindsessen gjør, og netop dette beviser, at han har gjort Bevægelsen 
uendeligt."
86
 
 
As you well may imagine, the new aspect of the motion of resignation, that I now 
have expounded, is crucial to my overall understanding of the religious state. How the 
Knight resigns by diverting his feelings from the actual person, and towards his 
thought and image of the person instead. For it is here that one can see how the object 
of the religious love comes into being. This object is namely not, as I have pointed out 
in relation to Abraham, the actual person (if it be a person at all, but let us for 
simplicity's sake suppose that it is). It cannot be, as the religious is oblivious to any 
event that befalls this person, therefore he cannot meaningfully be said to have an 
emotional relation to this someone. (Remember: even if Isaac is lost, he is not lost to 
Abraham, and Abraham is not affected by it.) Therefore, as I expressed myself in that 
foregoing context, the religious person relates to an idealization of the person he 
loves, and not to that person as he actually exists separately from him. And what we 
see here is exactly the kernel of what this idealization really is. 
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The full idealization is created when the thought and image of the princess, towards 
which the young man in question is lovingly devoted at the stage of resignation, 
becomes animated by God's assurance that this imaginary relation will become 
something definitely realized. This transformation takes place through the 
performance of the motion of faith, that is, it takes place when the young man forms a 
belief in spite of his better judgement, and in virtue of the absurd - that everything is 
possible for God - that it will become so. The princess will become his, God will see 
to it. 
 
The image and thought of the princess thereby becomes something more than a mere 
empty signifier belonging to the dimension of the imaginary. It gains a peculiar form 
of confirmation that places it above being a mere fantasy. A form of confirmation that 
is categorically different from the normal kind, that is, the empirical kind whereby an 
idea is verified – if it is verified – by being seen as an adequate representation of 
reality. For it is not an adequate representation of reality, nor does the young man 
believe it to be. In reality, he does not relate to the princess. Yet he knows with 
absolute certainty that this will become the case. He will win her. For after having 
resigned his love for her, and given himself over to a melancholy love directed at his 
memory of her, satisfied in his dissatisfaction, so to speak, he now regains her, not 
through interaction with the girl herself, but by his belief in God. 
 
Kierkegaard: "Vi ville nu lade Troens Ridder give Møde i det omtalte Tilfælde. Han 
gjør aldeles det samme, som den anden Ridder, han giver uendeligt Afkald paa den 
Kjærlighed, der er hans Livs Indhold, han er forsonet i Smerten; men da skeer 
Vidunderet, han gjør endnu en Bevægelse, forunderligere end Alt, thi han siger: jeg 
troer dog, at jeg faaer hende, i Kraft nemlig af det Absurde, i Kraft af, at for Gud er 
Alting muligt. Det Absurde hører ikke til de Differentser, der ligge indenfor 
Forstandens eget Omfang. Det er ikke identisk med det Usandsynlige, det Uventede, 
det Uformodede. I det Øieblik, Ridderen resignerede, da forvissede han sig om 
Umuligheden, menneskelig talt, dette var Forstandens Resultat, og han havde Energi 
nok til at tænke det. I uendelig Forstand var det derimod muligt, det er ved at 
resignere derpaa, men denne Besidden er jo tillige en Opgiven, men dog er denne 
Besidden for Forstanden ingen Absurditet; thi Forstanden vedblev at beholde Ret i, at 
i den Endelighedens Verden, hvor den hersker, var og blev det en Umulighed. Denne 
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Bevidsthed har Troens Ridder ligesaa klar; det Eneste, der altsaa kan frelse ham, er 
det Absurde, og dette griber han ved Troen. Han erkjender altsaa Umuligheden og i 
samme Øieblik troer han det Absurde; thi vil han uden med al sin Sjæls Lidenskab og 
af sit ganske Hjerte at erkjende Umuligheden, indbilde sig at have Troen, da bedrager 
han sig selv, og hans Vidnesbyrd har intetsteds hjemme, da han end ikke er kommen 
til den uendelige Resignation."
87
 
 
The key part of this quote in view to the interpretation that I am defending here - that 
a Knight of Faith does not relate to the actual object of his love, but to an idealization 
of it instead - is when Kierkegaard says that the Knight of Faith never stops believing 
that in a finite sense a relationship to the princess is impossible, but that he, 
nonetheless, in an infinite sense believes that he will win her. As Kierkegaard sums it 
up in the quote: "Han erkjender altsaa Umuligheden og i samme Øieblik troer han det 
Absurde; thi vil han uden med al sin Sjæls Lidenskab og af sit ganske Hjerte at 
erkjende Umuligheden, indbilde sig at have Troen, da bedrager han sig selv, og hans 
Vidnesbyrd har intetsteds hjemme, da han end ikke er kommen til den uendelige 
Resignation."
88
 Which means, clearly, that the Knight of Faith relates to the princess 
in two ways: He simultanously relates to the fact that he cannot get her, in as much as 
she belongs to the finite, and the fact that he nonetheless will win her, in as much as 
she belongs to the infinite. Therefore, he has, in one sense, given her up. He has given 
her up in as much as she belongs to the finite, which is to say, in as much as she 
belongs to the earthly sphere - the real. And yet, he knows full well that she will be 
his. His desire for her will be satisfied, his ideal for himself will be realized. Because 
she is guaranteed him in an infinite sense, that is, in a sense that contrasts with the real 
(which is the finite). The way in which she is his, or will be his, is, therefore, in an 
ideal (non-real) sense, and the way in which he relates to her, is as an idealization, 
seeing as he has given her up in as much as she belongs to the finite. And now, solely 
relates to the infinite. 
 
The point is this, the Knight of Faith does in no manner of speaking reverse the 
resignation he undergoes as the first part of the double-movement, he wins the 
princess back at "a higher level" instead. Therefore, the princess he wins "back" is not 
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the actual, real, living, breathing human being, which only is to be found at "the lower 
level". It is his image of her animated by the divine.  
 
One can see the whole thing this way: The young man's original state, before 
venturing out upon this three stage process , is one in which he experiences a strong 
desire for the princess. In this state his relation to her is aimed directly at her. It is a 
normal sort of love relation, of the type wherein one of the involved is unaware of the 
other's amorous feelings (not to mention his mere existence). Now, seeing as the 
young man understood precisely this, that a realization of the love relation that he so 
much covets is impossible, he resigned. But seeing as he also understood that his love 
and desire for the princess was so strong that it would be impossible for him to simply 
abandon it, and never deal with it again, he, simultanously while withdrawing his 
emotions from her, diverts them inward towards his memory and image of her. He 
starts to love her, therefore, just as if she had been definitely lost to him - like a person 
that is involved in a more regular relationship, would love his beloved if she died, and 
was now only to be found in his own imagination and memory. This is the state of 
things after the resignation. Through the next step, the motion of faith, this image and 
thought of her that he now so much covets in itself, and not in view to what they are 
the though and image of, regains a kind reality for him, by being related, not the to 
empirical world around him, but to the assurance he gains by his belief in God that his 
love will be realized. 
 
It should additionally be noted that his relation to the idealization he gains through the 
motion of faith in no way distorts his view of the empirical reality surrounding him. 
The religious sphere is not a form of psychosis. This can be seen through the fact that 
the motion of resignation is a prerequisite for gaining faith, together with the fact that 
the motion of faith in no way disturbs the resignation that is undertaken in order to get 
to it. This meaning that the Knight of Faith is always fully aware of the state of things 
at the level of the real. He knows that the princess is a finite impossibility for him. It is 
precisely therefore he undertakes the motion of faith. Securing her for himself on a 
different level than that of the real. 
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Kierkegaard: "...saaledes at leve glad og lykkelig hvert Øyeblik i Kraft af det 
Absurde... det er Vidunderligt."
89
 ('ota bene: happy by virtue of the absurd, not by 
virtue of anything real or rational.) 
 
 
3.4 - Conclusion 
 
The main ambition of this chapter has been two-fold: It has sought, firstly, to 
understand how it is possible to become emotionally autonomous in the sense that I 
have spoken of throughout the essay. Secondly, it has sought, through the realization 
of the first part of the ambition, to indisputably establish that emotional autonomy is a 
real feature of Kierkegaard’s concept of faith. (Additionally, and connected with 
these, I have attempted to explain Kierkegaard's defence of the parable of Abraham 
and Isaac.) 
 
The manner in which I have gone about realizing the ambition has been to expound 
and explain two stories that are central to the argument of Frygt og Bæven: the story 
of Abraham and Isaac, and the story of the young man and the princess. Both of 
which are meant by Kierkegaard to illustrate the religious condition. What I have 
shown, or what I have tried to show, is that the common feature of these stories is that 
the protagonist of both (Abraham, the young man) is in an important sense indifferent 
as to what happens to the person he loves. I have explained this feature by the 
hypothesis that the two Knights of Faith, by virtue of their faith, do not truly relate to 
the actual object of their love (they have resigned their love for them), but instead 
relate to idealizations of these objects. By an “idealization” I mean the thought of the 
object in question as one perceives it, not in reality, but in the manner that one knows 
– through one’s faith – that God will deliver it unto one. My point is, therefore, that 
through his faith the Knight of Faith does not respond emotionally to reality as it is, 
but to a divine idealization of it. 
 
And my general point is that given such a state of affairs, as it represents a general 
feature of the Knight of Faith, this places the Knight of Faith in a state of emotional 
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autonomy. It does this because it becomes impossible to adversely affect the Knight 
of Faith by exterior means, i.e. by changes in the "actual" or "real" object of his love 
(by which I mean the original object of his love, the one belonging to the world “out 
there”, the non-I). He is, quite simply, emotionally closed off from the world 
surrounding him. 
 
Let me present you with one last quote so as to verify this point, a third and as of yet 
unmentioned example of a Knight of Faith: "Underveis tænker han paa, at hans Kone 
vist har en apparte lille Ret varm Mad til ham, naar han kommer hjem, f.Ex. et stegt 
Lammehoved med grønt til. Hvis han mødte en Ligesindet, da kunde han vedblive 
lige til Østerport at samtale med ham om denne Ret med en Lidenskab, der vilde 
passe for en Restaurateur. Tilfældigvis eier han ikke 4 Sk., og dog troer han fuldt og 
fast, at hans Kone har hiin lækkre Ret til ham. Har hun den, da skal det være et 
misundelsesværdigt Syn for fornemme Folk, begeistrende for Menigmand at see ham 
spise; thi hans Appetit er stærkere end Esaus. Hans Kone har den ikke - besynderligt 
nok - han er aldeles den Samme."
90
 
 
The point is also here, though here in relation to a trivial point in the man's life and 
not something of utmost importance as in the case of Abraham and the young man, 
that circumstances in the real world are unable to adversely affect the Knight of Faith. 
 
In regard to how one attains emotional autonomy, my hypothesis is that it is attained 
through a three-step process of fixation, resignation and faith, as illustrated in the 
story of the young man and the princess. The gist of this process is that an individual 
that undergoes it first withdraws his emotional investment from the original object of 
his attachment, diverts the feelings purely into the memory and thought of this object, 
and then, secondly, through his faith in God gains certainty that the object will 
become his in a more than imaginary sense – as I have explained it earlier on, the 
individual wins his heart’s desire, not in the real world, but through God and 
confidence in his omnipotence. 
 
The way in which this state of emotional autonomy saves us from despair, that is, 
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saves us from the possibility of not conforming to our own ideal for ourselves, is by 
making the objects that we depend upon to realize this ideal (whatever they may be) 
guaranteed to us by God. Hence they partake in God’s infiniteness and become 
something infinite by which we can relate to ourselves.
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4 – General conclusion 
 
 
4.1 – At the end of the tether 
 
I said in my general introduction that I would attempt to present Kierkegaard’s 
concept of faith as involving two theoretically separate levels: One level which was 
concerned with faith as the state of absolute belief in God, and another level which 
was concerned with faith as the state of emotional autonomy. I have done this in the 
form of presenting two separate motions of faith, both of which it is necessary to 
perform in order to reach faith proper – in order to secure that faith is both an 
unconditional faith in God, and the negation of angst and despair. The first motion, 
detailed in Chapter 2, is a two-step process by which one reaches a state of absolute 
belief in God through what I have called a negative leap; the other motion, detailed in 
Chapter 3, is an even more complex psychological process whereby an individual 
isolates himself emotionally from the mundane world by, essentially, redirecting his 
emotional attachments from the original (and mundane) objects in question, and unto 
divine simulacra of these objects.  
 
The main thought behind this essay has been to emphasize this last part of the concept 
of faith – what I have termed emotional autonomy – by delineating its role in the 
overall concept as it is found in Kierkegaard. I have found this important because it is 
this that in the last instance should motivate an individual, according to Kierkegaard’s 
argumentation, to develop faith in God. As I noted in the introduction, Kierkegaard 
has a practical intent with his writings, they are not meant as disinterested, scientific 
pieces that simply investigate certain interrelated theological and psychological 
topics, they are – though Kierkegaard at many points explicitly denies this – 
messianic in their nature. They are meant to save us. They analyse our existential 
condition, identifies an essential shortcoming, or weakness with our nature, and sets 
before us the solution to our misery – which is a religious solution. As I said in 
Chapter 2, man chooses to believe in God in order to escape despair. But this has, if 
we think about it, the effect that the significance of the religious for man is dependent 
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upon an existential need. Now, I have no doubts as to the fact that Kierkegaard’s ideal 
in regard to the religious, is that it should be an unconditional devotion to God. But as 
I have shown in Chapter 2, this devotion both is and is not unconditional. It is 
unconditional in the sense that no rational factor informs the Kierkegaardian subject’s 
belief in God – the belief is acquired through a wholly subjective leap of faith. At the 
same time, though, it is conditional in the sense that the subject’s devotion to God is 
fuelled by an infinite (constant) existential need – the need to escape despair. My 
point by bringing attention to this fact now is that through this nature of the 
Kierkegaardian scheme, the religious does not really acquire an unconditional 
significance for the individual, but has an existential significance – as it is the 
elementary existential need that secures one’s devotion to the religious. My further 
point, with this in view, is that there is an important difference between it having an 
independent significance for the individual, and a significance that is derived from the 
individual’s existential situation. For in as much as the significance is derived, this 
means that when we are to understand the religious, and what the religious is in regard 
to an individual, we have to understand it on the basis of its existential consequences.  
 
In other words, contrary to what may strike one as the obvious, Kierkegaard’s ideal 
state is not what I would speak of as primarily a religious state. This is because the 
belief in God that characterizes the state as religious is merely a means to attain an 
existential end – to free oneself from despair. God is not what is sought in 
Kierkegaard’s ideal state, emotional autonomy is. And this is ultimately why I, in the 
general introduction, stated that the main thesis of this essay is that Kierkegaard's 
ideal state is a state of emotional autonomy. As it is this that constitutes the soul of the 
state, and not the belief in God. The belief in God is put in place in order to achieve 
this end. It should be remarked though that I am in no way denying the presence of 
the religious elements involved in this state, I am merely attempting to shift the focus 
away from the religious, and to what I find to be the true heart of the matter. 
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